

BLOOD TALKS: EUGENIC MODERNITY AND THE CREATION OF NEW JAPANESE

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In *fin-de-siècle* Japan, the ideal of “eugenic modernity,” or the application of scientific concepts and methods as a means to constitute both the nation and its constituent subjects (New Japanese), crystallized in the space of imperialism. Three of the main themes explored are the application of eugenic principles to make connections between biology, kinship, and the plasticity of the human body; to contemporize historical stigmas; and to promote “pure-bloodedness” and “ethnic-national endogamy” as cultural ideals.

Keywords: Eugenics; Colonialism; Consanguinity; Kinship; Japan

Superior seeds, superior fields, superior cultivation. (Ikeda 1927a)

Race-preservation and race-betterment have assumed the form of a religious cult [in Japan]. (Pearson 1909: 44)

“Blood talks” (*chi wa mono o iu*).¹ So Ikeda Shigenori began his eugenic manifesto for Japan, published in the January 1927 issue of his journal, *Yūsei Undō* (Eugenic Exercise/Movement).² Blood continues to “talk” in Japan today, and is a loquacious interlocutor on the subjects of sexual attraction, kinship, mentalité, national identity, and cultural uniqueness. Blood-type, moreover, is the basis for a very popular “sanguine horoscopy,” in addition to other systems of fortune-telling and personality analysis based on East Asian cosmology. Ikeda’s invocation of the narrative agency of blood reflects its widespread, contemporary use as a metaphor for “shared heredity” or “shared ancestry,” and even for the essential material imagined to constitute *the* Japanese race. In Japan and elsewhere in the industrializing world at the turn of the nineteenth century, race was conceptualized both as a mix of discrete biological and cultural characteristics, and as the specific group or human type that possessed and manifested those characteristics. Blood remains an organizing metaphor for profoundly significant, fundamental, and perduring assumptions about Japaneseness and otherness both within and outside of Japan. Eugenics, which I shall summarize for the moment as “instrumental and selective procreation”, provided a framework in *fin-de-siècle* Japan within which blood became a cipher for specifically modern ideas of “disciplinary bio-power.”³

Obviously, I am not the first scholar to point out the connection between blood and nationality in Japan; the theorists and ideologues about whom I write long precede me,

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and several of my contemporaries have addressed related subjects employing different methodologies, theories, and interpretations (e.g. Hayashida 1976; Dower 1986; Yoshino 1997; Frühstück 2003). The link between blood and nationality is certainly not unique to Japan but it is inflected in ways that distinguish the Japanese phenomenon from others. My most general objective is to layer into a coherent and demystifying narrative the cacophonous popular debates and welter of folk and scientific assumptions specifically about “Japanese”—and the Japaneseness of—blood and bodies. My specific and original scholarship addresses two large themes that bleed into each other, so to speak: the application of eugenic principles and propositions in fusing kinship and biology, and the normalization through popular eugenics of “ethnic national endogamy” as a dominant and modern cultural ideal.⁴

I must emphasize at the outset that “the popular” and “the scientific” did not inhabit opposite ends of a continuum of credibility. In *fin-de-siècle* Japan, eugenics constituted a synergism of theory, ideology, and practice that blurred and even fused any hypothetical boundary between the street and the laboratory. This blurring and fusion were symptomatic of “eugenic modernity,” by which I mean the application of scientific concepts and methods as the primary means to constitute both the nation and its constituent subjects.⁵ As my cited references attest—references that are at once factual and artifactual—established scientists used the mass media to foster an appreciation of race betterment through customized procreation, and impresarios organized traveling hygiene exhibitions and eugenic beauty contests (the judges for which included some of the same scientists). Through eugenics, science was popularized, and the public was prevailed upon to cultivate a modern attitude of scientific curiosity.⁶

The new scientific order in Japan was introduced under the aegis of nationalism and empire-building. Beginning with the colonization of Okinawa in 1874 followed by that of Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, Micronesia in 1919, Manchuria in 1931, North China by 1937, and much of Southeast Asia by 1942, the state consolidated through military force a vast Asian-Pacific domain, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere (*daitôa kyôeiken*), a rubric coined in August 1940. Although empire-building forms the backdrop of this article, my focus is on colonizing practices pursued and implemented *within* Japan among the Japanese people, who constituted a proving ground for such practices throughout Asia and the Pacific. If East Asian prosperity was the euphemistic metaphor for Japanese dominance abroad, “family” was the operable image at home. The concept of a family-state (*kazoku kokka*) system was invented by late nineteenth-century ideologues to create a familiar and modern community—the nation—where one had not existed before. Some ideologues stretched out the family metaphor and likened nationality to membership in an exceptional “bloodline” (*kettô*).⁷

BONES, FLESH, SEEDS, AND BLOOD

According to cultural historian Nishida Tomomi, it was during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries that “blood” (*chi, ketsu*), equated in earlier periods with death and ritual pollution, gradually acquired a positive metaphorical meaning of “life force” and lineage. It also became the main criterion of nationality, which, ever since the promulgation of the first constitution in 1890, continues to be based on the principle of *jus sanguinus*.⁸ Before the seventeenth century, the dominant symbolism of blood was negative, located as it was in the ritually polluted female body; menstruation and parturition were classified in Shinto and Buddhism as “dirty” and especially dangerous to males (Nishida 1995: 18–19). In addition to banishing females from certain “sacred” sites and spaces, males could avoid “blood poisoning” by undertaking Shinto purification rituals.⁹

Nishida surmises that the terms *ketsuen* (blood relationship), *kettô* (blood line), and *ketsuzoku* (blood relatives), indicative of an affirmative meaning of blood, were coined

around the mid-nineteenth century when they began to appear in a wide range of literary sources, such as Jesuit dictionaries,¹⁰ household registers, and epic tales of famous warrior lineages, among others. Before blood acquired its new, positive meaning, heredity was denoted by the term *kotsuniku*, or bone–flesh, where “bone” (*kotsu*) referred to paternity, and “flesh” (*niku*) to maternity (Nishida 1995: 32–35).¹¹ Another term in use since at least the tenth century to identify paternity specifically was *tane* (seed). From the late-nineteenth century onward, the Japanese-style term *hitodane* (lit. person [*hito*] seed [*t(d)ane*]) was used to denote heredity in the sense of “germ plasm,” as then understood. Thus, the phrase *tane ga kawaru* (seed changes) refers to children with the same mother and a different father (Nishida 1995: 35).¹²

Nishida notes that in Japan, unlike in China, “blood relations” (qua heredity) were not privileged over other types of social intimacy, such as adoption, which continues to be widely practiced in Japan (Nishida 1995: 18, 65, 76). Important to realize in this connection is the fact that adoptions were and are arranged for pragmatic reasons, most commonly to secure a male to occupy the *situs* of household (*ie*) successor. They were not undertaken for personal or emotional needs, objectives that can be realized without actual co-residence and even through *post mortem* adoptions and ghost marriages (Lebra 1993: 125; Van Bremen 1998).¹³ An increasingly positive interpretation of “blood” was accompanied by the normalization of patrilineality as the dominant rule of household succession. Moreover, within the framework of the Meiji constitution, “blood” was the basis of and for a person’s civic and legal provenance and attendant rights. Until its codification, patrilineality was especially characteristic of pre-modern samurai, or warrior, households in particular, which comprised less than eight percent of the population of roughly twenty-seven million persons during the Tokugawa (or Edo) period (1603–1867), and specifically the 1720s (Honjō 1936: 21). Although bonafide membership in the samurai class was determined by the paternal “seed,” intra-class adoption was also widely practiced.¹⁴ The Meiji Civil Code sanctioned both the patriarchal household as the smallest legal unit of society and father-to-son succession as the most general, normative pattern of household continuity—a pattern referred to as “samuraization.” Today, by contrast, under the auspices of the postwar constitution individuals are legal entities in their own right and succession a subjective arrangement. Although equal inheritance is mandated in the postwar constitution, the majority of Japanese continue the earlier practice of male primogeniture. Furthermore, as in the pre-modern period, sons need not be the biological offspring of fathers; rather, the terms “father” and “son” denote gender roles and social (including adoptive) statuses and not necessarily a biological relationship (although they may *connote* one).

Despite the normalization of patrilineality as an extension of the Meiji state’s authority, eugenicists were unanimous in stressing the importance of reckoning kinship bilineally in order to build what they believed to be a scientific foundation on which launch their collective project of bettering the Japanese race and creating a foundational generation of New Japanese. They also critiqued sharply the deleterious consequences of patriarchy and patrilineal ideology on the health and hygiene of girls and women. For example, writing in January 1945, Tōgō Minoru, a eugenicist, bureaucrat, and colonial administrator, echoed his predecessors in declaring that the physical and mental health of females had been woefully neglected under the feudal, androcentric, and xenophobic regime of the Tokugawa shogunate (Tōgō 1945: 34). Although early feminists supported many aspects of the eugenics movement, such as birth control and modern, scientific approaches to pregnancy and childbirth (see Otsubo 1999), the eugenicists’ critique of patriarchy and patrilineal ideology was not motivated by overtly feminist concerns. Ikeda Shigenori, for example, who had doctorates in eugenics and women’s history from Jena University in

Germany, addressed the difference between the women's and eugenics movements in a 1929 article:

Many people believe that the objectives of eugenics are contrary to those of the women's movement; namely, that eugenics calls not for women's liberation but for women's fulltime role as birthmothers and childraisers. Actually, the eugenics movement wishes to encourage all of the above—liberation, birthing, and childraising. Of course, a female's primary role is to give birth, a fact that should not reduce but greatly elevate her social status. Those who think otherwise have a poor understanding of eugenics. (Ikeda 1929: 26–27)

The creation of the Eugenic Marriage Popularization Society (Yūseikekkon fūkyūkai) on November 11, 1935 provided an institutional dimension to Ikeda's notion of a gynocentric eugenics.¹⁵ The Society, the majority of whose members were female, was established under the auspices of the Japan Association of Race Hygiene (Nippon minzokueisei kyōkai), founded by Nagai Hisomu in 1930. Nagai was a professor of physiology at Tokyo University who played a central role in the drafting and passage of the National Eugenics Law of 1940.¹⁶ He was preceded by a decade by Ikeda Shigenori, a journalist *cum* eugenicist who also devoted much energy toward popularizing eugenics among girls and women. Ikeda differed in important ways from Nagai with respect to the social applications of eugenics. His Japan Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association (Nippon yūseiundō kyōkai), founded in 1926, was the first such organization to actively recruit girls and women into its various programs, some of which I introduce subsequently.

The (non-feminist) gynocentric, maternalist bent of these early eugenics associations was reflected in the postwar Eugenic Protection Law of 1948, which, in addition to preventing “the birth of eugenically inferior offspring,” aimed to “protect maternal health and life.” The 1948 law was replaced six years ago with the Maternal Protection Law of 1996, from which references to “eugenically inferior offspring” were omitted and a singular emphasis placed on the protection of motherhood and maternal health (Norgren 2001: 145, 155). The historical debates about blood and recent legal developments concerning maternity help us to understand why in Japan (unlike in Germany, Israel, and the United States), “eugenics” is neither an avoided nor negatively charged term.¹⁷

MIXED BLOOD VERSUS PURE BLOOD

The concept of “pure blood” as a criterion of authentic Japaneseness began circulating in public discourse by the 1880s in many venues and media. “Purity” referred metaphorically to a body—including the national body—free from symbolic pollution and disease-bearing pathogens as well as to genealogical orthodoxy. As a newly dominant concept, “pure bloodedness” also effectively tightened what historically had been a loose sense of consanguinity. Although intellectual and ideological rivals, the founders of eugenics associations were nevertheless alike in seeking to improve *the* Japanese race by making bloodline synonymous with household succession (cf. Lebra 1995: 125). Their emphasis on the necessary bilineality of a national genealogy consisting of “pure bloods” was not represented in the Meiji Civil Code, which instead privileged male primogeniture and Japanese paternity, or the “male seed,” as the sole criterion of nationality and citizenship. This criterion was retained in the postwar Civil Code until 1985, when the nationality law was changed as a result of legal pressure brought by feminists to have the “blood” of Japanese females recognized as an independent and authentic agent of Japanese nationality and citizenship.

In contrast, bilineal kinship continues to supersede all other modes of reckoning the familial, legal, social, and political status of *burakumin* (“outcastes”) and spirit-animal possessors, that is, persons or households thought to control, or to be controlled by,

supernatural animals.¹⁸ In the Tokugawa period, their symbolic pollution and marginality was imagined to be “infectious,” and later, with the conflation in eugenic discourse of blood and heredity, inherited and inheritable. In these cases, the new “affirmative” meaning of blood as life force and lineage did not replace the earlier, “negative” meaning of blood as a polluting substance, but rather congealed as both a coeval and a mutually constitutive system of belief. These tenacious popular beliefs, including the dangers of “female blood,” represent another or an alternate world of local practices revolving around the negative valences of blood.

By the same token, the blood-type fads today represent both a continuation and a distortion of nineteenth-century scientific ideas about bodies and blood that were embraced by leading intellectuals and introduced to the public at the turn of the century through a centralized education system and burgeoning mass media. (Although many of these ideas are no longer perceived as “scientific” they nevertheless persist in various guises.) The specific field of science that took up the “positive” meaning of blood as its subject was eugenics and race science, and it fueled a discourse that permeated all aspects of everyday life in Japan by 1900. The public sphere shaped by the discourse of eugenics and race science was premised on a future-oriented vision of a racially improved nation-state, one peopled by taller, heavier, healthier, and fertile men and women whose anthropometrically ideal bodies would serve as the caryatids of the expanding Japanese empire.

At this juncture it is necessary to backtrack in order to review the beginnings of the imperial New Japan. The defeat of the xenophobic shogunate and the restoration of the emperor Meiji in 1868 within a German-style parliamentary system ushered in unprecedented social reforms based on a policy of selective and controlled Westernization. Among these reforms was the creation of a nation informed by the utopian ideology of the family-state system, noted earlier. People who had had primarily identified themselves and who were identified by region, domain (*han*), locality, and fixed social and domestic status, had to imagine themselves first and foremost as “Japanese.” These layers of identity were contained by the new, umbrella-like category of *kokumin*, or “citizen,” in the sense of subject of the imperial nation-state, itself imagined as having an organic, corporeal form (*kokutai*). Eugenicists and nationalists believed that New Japan (*shin'nippon*) could “compete successfully with the West in international affairs” and pursue an imperialist agenda of expansion and colonization only if it were peopled with New Japanese. Just how New Japanese could and should be created was the subject of a heated and divisive debate among the ideologues of blood that has shaped the discourse of eugenics to this day.

Eugenics, coined by Francis Galton in 1883, was translated into Japanese as the romanized *yuzenikkusu* and as the neologisms *yūseigaku* (science of superior birth) and *jinshukaizengaku* (science of race betterment). These terms were used synonymously with two terms coined a little earlier: “race betterment” (*minzoku/jinshu kairyō*) and “race hygiene” (*minzoku/jinshu eisei*).¹⁹ *Minzoku* and *jinshu*, the two Japanese words for “race” in both the social and phenotypical senses, for the most part were used interchangeably, although *jinshu* remains the more clinical, social-scientific term (cf. *Rasse*) and *minzoku* the more popular and populist term (cf. *Volk*).²⁰ When prefixed with names, such as Nippon and Yamato, *minzoku* signified the conflation of phenotype, geography, culture, spirit, history, and nationhood. All of these semantic and semiotic inventions were part of the ideological agenda of the Meiji state and were incorporated into the postwar constitution of 1947, which retained the definition of nationality and citizenship as a matter of blood, or *jus sanguinus* (as opposed to *jus solis*).

Eugenics, in the sense of instrumental and selective procreation, was hardly a new concept in *fin-de-siècle* Japan. Historically and mytho-historically, as well as across classes and statuses of people, the maintenance of genealogical integrity was a key strategy of household

succession. Integrity in this historical context was understood as continuity; that is, the successful augmentation or replacement of household members from one generation to the next through strategically arranged marriages and adoptions.²¹ Eugenics, in contrast, was equated with broad societal and nationalist goals, such as the propagation of New Japanese and the rationalization of marriage, with respect to both partner choice and the betrothal ceremony. Introduced under the auspices of eugenic was a new national premium on “pure blood” and “wholesome” (*kenzen*) heredity as a necessary condition of race betterment and modern nation-building. Heredity (*iden*) was understood in a general sense as whatever one received from one’s parents and ancestors, making them morally as well as medically culpable should their offspring and ascendants be less than wholesome. Japanese race scientists thus also worked to reform marriage and sexual practices more generally because it was through sex, regulated by the institution of marriage—as well as licensed prostitution—that either positive or negative eugenic precepts, or both, were most effectively implemented.²²

Positive eugenics, promoted by Ikeda Shigenori, refers to the improvement of circumstances of sexual reproduction and thus incorporates advances in sanitation, nutrition, and physical education into strategies to shape the reproductive choices and decisions of individuals and families. The effects of biology (genetics) and environment are conflated. In this connection, “eugenic” was often used in the early twentieth-century Japanese literature as both an adjective meaning, and a euphemism for, “hygienic” and “scientific.” Negative eugenics, enthusiastically advocated by Nagai Hisomu, involves the prevention of sexual reproduction, through induced abortion or sterilization, among people deemed unfit. “Unfit” was an ambiguous term that included alcoholics, “lepers,” the mentally ill, the criminal, the physically disabled, and the sexually alternative among other categories of people. Some traditional or premodern categories of stigmatized alterity, such as the *burakumin*, were recast in scientific terms and deemed uneugenic, while others, such as horoscopic identity, were dismantled as “superstitions and folk beliefs” (*meishin*) of no eugenic consequence, although they could impede the implementation of scientific practices.²³

Eugenics provided an avenue for the application of science to social problems, including public health, education, and hygiene. The fields of eugenics and public health shared much jargon and many assumptions, attitudes, and aims, not only in Japan, but in other countries as well (cf. Wikler 1999: 192). What Martin Pernick notes about early twentieth-century America pertains equally well to Japan, namely, that “eugenic methods often were modeled on the infection control techniques of public health”: “infections were caused by germs; inheritance was governed by germ plasm. In both cases, ‘germs’ meant microscopic seeds. Both types of germs enabled disease to propagate and grow, to spread contamination from the bodies of the diseased to the healthy” through the medium of blood, a metaphor for heredity and a vehicle for infection (Pernick 1997: 1767, 1769). Like their international counterparts, Japanese eugenicists tended to collapse biology and culture, and, consequently, held either explicitly or implicitly Lamarckian views on race formation and racial temperament. Thus, even those who were environmentally inclined, also assumed that complex phenomena, such as the “uniquely Japanese *ie* (household) system,” were “carried in the ‘blood,’ if only as ‘instincts’ or ‘temperamental proclivities’” (Ikeda 1927a,b; Stocking 1968: 25). The melding of biology and culture, nature and culture, is also evident in the interchangeability of *jinsbu* (race) and *minzoku* (ethnic nation), and in the prescriptions for race betterment. Through networks of modern institutions and industries, such as the army, schools, hygiene exhibitions, immigration training programs, the press, fashion, advertising, popular genealogies, and so forth, the Japanese people were encouraged to think in totally new and different ways about their bodies. They were to think of their bodies as plastic, in the sense of

capable of being molded, and as adaptable, pliable, and transformable through new hygienic regimens of nutrition and physical exercise.

For males, these regimens were part of their military training beginning in 1873, when a modern conscription army was established, replacing the hereditary warrior (samurai) class that epitomized the Tokugawa period. Females, exempt from military service, were exposed to these regimens at the many private sector schools and academies that competed to enroll girls and women whose education was more or less neglected by the Meiji government, at least initially. Clothing also fell under the eugenic gaze. Whereas boys and men were encouraged to wear crewcuts and Western-style outfits to symbolize the modernity of New Japan, girls and women were to represent through costume and hairstyle a nostalgically re-imagined traditional Japanese culture, although they were urged to loosen the normally tightly cinched *obi*, or sashes, of their kimono, and to simplify the traditional chignon to facilitate the regular cleaning and combing of their hair. All Japanese were advised by public health agents to learn how to walk properly, to use chairs whenever possible, and to avoid kneeling for long lengths of time, which was thought to cause bowed legs and pigeon-toedness (Irizawa 1939 [1913]: 17–21, 34, 61). The desirable corporeal results and aesthetic effects of these new hygienic practices were perceived as transmittable by blood through “eugenic marriages” (*yūsei kekkon*), as elaborated below.

In Japan, the discourse of eugenics clustered around two essentially incommensurable positions concerning blood: the “pure-blood,” or *junketsu*, position, and the “mixed-blood,” or *konketsu*, position. The proponents of each position acknowledged the “mixed-blooded,” or multiethnic, ancient history of Japan, an idea developed in the late-nineteenth century by the German physician and genealogist, Erwin von Baelz, who had spent thirty years in Japan (1876–1906) studying the racial origins of the Japanese people. Baelz, applying the then dominant teleological evolutionist paradigm, proposed that the so-called Yamato stem-race, associated with the Imperial Household and its allegedly unbroken lineage stretching back over 2,500 years, had, by the sixth-century, conquered and subjugated the different racial groups co-existing on the islands. These groups, he maintained, were assimilated selectively and slowly, so that by the nineteenth century, “Yamato blood” was a refined and superior substance (Hayashida 1976: 24). Japanese pundits favoring the pure-blood position were keen on preserving the eugenic integrity of the pristine Yamato stem-race; those promoting the mixed-blood position, enumerated the eugenic benefits of hybrid vigor through the mixing of Japanese and non-Japanese blood (Robertson 2001a).²⁴

The “mixed-blood” position was first articulated in an 1884 essay, *A Treatise on the Betterment of the Japanese Race* (*Nippon jinshu kairyōron*), penned by the Keio University-educated journalist Takahashi Yoshio. Invoking a Social Darwinist scenario, Takahashi argued that Japan was undergoing a transition from a “semi-civilized” to a “civilized” status represented, in his view, by northern European countries and their taller, heavier, and stronger populations. This “civilized” status could be expedited through the marriage of Japanese males and Anglo females, or, as he phrased it, the “mixed-marriage of yellows and whites” (*kōhaku zakkon*).²⁵ Mixed-blood marriages, Takahashi hypothesized, would create a taller, heavier, and stronger, in short “a physically superior Japanese race, thereby making it possible for the Japanese to compete successfully with Europeans and Americans in international affairs” (Suzuki 1983: 32–34, 39).

The “pure-blood” position was advocated by Katō Hiroyuki, a veteran politician, imperial advisor, and chancellor of Tokyo University. Katō’s scathing critique of the mixed-marriage plan was published in 1886 in both an academic journal, *Tōyō Gakugei* [Oriental Arts and Sciences] and the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*, a leading daily newspaper. To summarize, Katō first of all objected to the notion that the Japanese were less civilized than Europeans.²⁶ Second, he argued that interbreeding “yellows” and “whites” would create a completely new

hybrid category of person whose political and social “status” would be unclear and perplexing. Miscegenation, Katô concluded, would result in race *transformation* and not race betterment, and would, over the course of several generations, seriously dilute the pure blood—or racial and cultural essence—of the Japanese. He declared emphatically that whereas mixed-blood marriages between yellows and whites would insure the “complete defeat” (*zenpai*) of Japan by Westerners, pure-bloodedness would insure for eternity Japan’s distinctive racial history, culture, and social system (Suzuki 1983: 35–38; Katô 1990 [1886]: 33, 40–47; Fujino 1998: 385).²⁷

Although the pure-blood position emerged fairly quickly as the dominant one, the pros and cons of both positions were hotly debated in the eugenics literature through 1945, and continue today in other guises. For example, in an article published in the May 1911 issue of *Jinsei-Der Mensch* (Human Life), the first eugenics journal published in Japan, zoologist Oka’asa Jirô scoffed at the proposal of “white–yellow marriages,” dismissing it as one example of the “maniacal fascination with the West” (*seiyôshinsui*) that defined the early Meiji period (Oka’asa 1915: 2).²⁸ Over twenty-five years later, in 1939, political theorist Ijichi Susumu published an article in *Kaizô* (Reconstruction), a popular, generally liberal, literary periodical, advocating the intermarriage of Japanese males and “carefully selected” Manchurian females. He referred to his proposal as a “racial blood transfusion” (*minzoku yûketsu*) and argued that “mixing superior Japanese blood with inferior Manchurian blood would stimulate the development and civilization of inferior peoples by producing hybrid offspring who would mature as natural political leaders” (Ijichi 1939: 86).²⁹ Ijichi’s ideas in turn were rebuffed by Tôgô Minoru, noted earlier, whose ideas about blood circulated widely during the 1920s through 1940s. Tôgô reiterated Katô’s objections to mixed-blooded offspring, arguing that they constituted a “new race” (*shinminzoku*); miscegenation by definition could only fail to produce the cultural objective of colonial assimilation, namely Japanization (*nipponka*). Mixed marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians, he asserted, would effectively corrupt and “dissolve the soul (*tamashii*) of the pure Japanese race and national body” and thwart the imperial expansion of the Japanese people (Tôgô 1938: 142–144; 1945).³⁰

I realized, in the course of my research on blood ideologies, that the central tenet of the “pure-blood” position was anchored in a centuries-old construction of radical otherness transposed in a new vocabulary. Although he used mathematical charts and invoked modern science, Katô Hiroyuki’s argument for preserving blood purity was strikingly similar to the persistent “one-drop” folk theory regulating marriages between symbolically pure and polluted Japanese. Briefly, according to this theory, *burakumin* and spirit-animal possessors are labeled “black stock” (*kurosui*) and their opposites are labeled “white stock” (*shirosui*). The term *sui*, or “stock” or “line,” is very close to the nineteenth-century meaning of blood as an inheritable biological *and* cultural substance, but its affective range is much broader and the transmission process analogous to infection and contamination. Miscegenation among black and white “stockholders” would turn both a “white stock” person and that person’s entire household “black” (Yoshida 1977 [1972]: 58–60, 87–91; Ishizuka 1983 [1972]: 75–77, 112–115). Katô seemed to define the nation in terms of *shirosui*, a “white stock” lineage that could be irrevocably sullied—or turned “black”—by the mixing Japanese and non-Japanese blood.

BLOOD MARRIAGES

The central focus in the Japanese eugenics movement concentrated on the physiques and overall health of girls and women. Japanese eugenicists argued that the physical development

of Japanese girls and women had been neglected for centuries, resulting in their physiological inferiority. The need to grow the population in order to generate the human capital with which to fund nation- and empire-building motivated agents of the Japanese state and private sectors alike to focus their undivided attention on improving the bodies of females, who were, after all, the biological reproducers of the nation (cf. Kokumin to hansû jogai 1935; McClintock 1994). This part of the nationalist and imperialist enterprise was supported by some of the leading Japanese feminists, whose agenda of popularizing methods of birth control and promoting maternal health was incorporated into the discourse of eugenics, as I noted earlier (see also Otsubo 1999; Norgren 2001). In this connection, note that the early twentieth-century (1940) and postwar (1948 and 1996) eugenics legislation and laws alike have been understood as measures to protect the reproductive health of mothers. “Maternal protection” (*bosei hogo*), in fact, is one of the many euphemisms for eugenic practices today.

Generally speaking, the pronatalist state encouraged the improvement of the conditions surrounding female reproductivity instead of advocating sterilization as a way to reduce the reproduction of the unfit. The Welfare Ministry (*Kôseishô*), established in 1938, inaugurated a “propagate and multiply movement” (*umeyo fuyaseyo undô*), which included the staging of healthy-baby contests throughout the country. Especially fertile mothers were eulogized in the mass media as comprising a “fertile womb battalion” (*kodakara butai*). The Ministry also organized awards ceremonies, many of which were staged at department stores, where such mothers, babies in tow, were presented with certificates honoring their reproductive success.³¹ Already in 1930, Education Ministry (*Monbushô*) together with the *Tôkyo* and *Ôsaka Asahi Shinbun* (newspaper) companies, had inaugurated an annual nationwide contest to identify the top ten—of 260,000 contestants—“most healthy, eugenically fit children in Japan” (*nippon'ichi no kenkô yûryôji*). Contestants were selected from elementary schools throughout Japan and underwent further screening at the prefectural level before the finalists were selected by a central committee. In addition to a female and male winner, four pairs of runners up were selected along with five pairs of semi-finalists. Photographs of the scantily clad winners were published in the daily press along with charts detailing their physical measurements, medical histories, educational backgrounds, and maternal and paternal genealogies (*Kenkô yûryôji* 1930: 8–9; see also *Risô no yûryôji* 1931: 11) (Fig. 1).³² Eugenicians referred to this contest as a new (*shin*) *nenjû gyôji*, a term for the “annual events” comprising the agricultural calendar. In doing so, they sought to naturalize and traditionalize the incorporation into everyday life of eugenic practices as central both to the persistence of historical cultural practices and to the corporeal development of Japanese children (*Nippon'ichi no yûryôji no hyôshô* 1937: 8–9).

Worries about the anthropometric status of women and children were equaled by and linked to worries among a majority of eugenicians about the “high rate” of consanguineous marriages in Japan. One of the most prevalent topics in the four eugenics journals that I have scrutinized—*Jinsei-Der Mensch*, *Yûsei Undô* (Eugenic Exercise/Movement), *Yûsei* (Superior Birth), and *Yûseigaku* (Eugenics)—was the “detrimental consequences” of “marriages among blood relatives,” or *ketsuzoku kekkon*.³³ Much was made of how consanguineous marriages, mostly between first cousins, amounted five to six percent of all registered marriages (Yasui 1940a: 14; Furuya 1941: 117). It is not always clear from the Japanese literature what standard in relation to which this percentage constituted a “high rate.” The statistics provided by Ethel Elderton, a Galton Research Scholar writing in 1911 and much cited by her Japanese colleagues, may offer a useful cross-cultural comparison. Elderton concluded that the percentage of first-cousin marriages “among all classes in England” was around three percent, although she found a “very high percentage” of



FIGURE 1 The most eugenically fit children in Japan. Photograph by author of Nippon'ichi yûryôji (The most eugenically superior children in Japan) (1932).

cousin marriages, seven to eleven percent, in cases of deaf-mutism and albinism (Elderton 1911: 24-28).

Using population and registered-marriage statistics compiled by the Japanese government between 1933 and 1943, I calculated that five percent would amount to an annual average of somewhere between 24,000 and 33,000 registered marriages (Jinkô Mondai Kenkyûkai 1933-1943). The actual percentage of consanguineous marriages is actually much higher since many—in some cases over a third or more—marriages were not registered. Unfortunately, the number of unregistered, common-law marriages, or *naien*, for this period are not available, much less information as to what percentage of them were among “blood relatives” (Civisca 1957). Some villages, such as Narata and Yûshima in the Minamikoma district of Yamanashi prefecture, were known as “blood-marriage hamlets” (*ketsuzoku kekkon buraku*) because the vast majority of inhabitants had married their first cousins, half cousins, second cousins (*hatoko*), uncles, or nieces. These two villages were the subjects of a survey initiated in September 1943 by the Welfare Ministry, the results of which

were published in 1949 (Shinozaki 1949). Yoko Imaizumi, a demographer employed by the same Ministry, notes that the proportion of consanguineous marriages in Japan averaged 16 percent in the 1920s (Imaizumi 1988: 235). Curiously, the American anthropologist John Embree elected *not* to explore the phenomenon of the “frequent cousin marriages” that he encountered while conducting pioneering fieldwork in rural Kyushu during the late 1930s. He did, however, note that “missionaries” of the eugenic marriage campaign were active in the area, and that the practice of consanguineous marriage was “being discouraged by more educated people on the questionable theory that it is biologically harmful” (Embree 1939: 88).

The countrywide practice of consanguineous marriage reflected the premium placed on what I call the “strategic endogamy” practiced during the 250 years of relative isolation maintained by the Tokugawa shogunate. By “strategic endogamy” I am referring to the transaction of marriages exclusively among and within certain categories of people defined by social status and geographical location; in Japan, “blood marriages” were not limited to elites. Familiarity was another desirable criterion, as it was popularly assumed that marriages between blood relatives were more stable and diplomatic in that they were free from disruptive anxieties about unknown or hidden factors.

Eugenicists in Japan and elsewhere argued among themselves over the negative and positive benefits of inbreeding among blood relatives. A minority in Japan pointed to Galton’s thesis of “hereditary genius” and other seemingly positive examples of consanguinity, including the ancient Athenians (cf. East and Jones 1919: 226–244). Applying quasi-Mendelian logic, they argued that in order for inbreeding to be risk-free, the blood of each party must be absolutely pure (Taguchi 1940: 33–35; Mizushima and Miyake 1942). The catch, of course, was that pure-bloodedness, while good to think, was never completely ascertainable. The majority of Japanese eugenicists believed that the transmission and manifestation of diseases and defects were expedited and multiplied through inbreeding. They echoed and cited their foreign counterparts, such as Ethel Elderton, in linking a host of disorders and diseases to the hereditary transmission of faulty germ-plasm (*iden*)—the word gene was not coined until 1908. In Elderton’s words,

The real danger of cousin marriage lies not in the existence of patent defects in the stock. Nor can we recommend cousin marriage because the stock has certain patent valuable characteristics. Behind the obviously advantageous quality may exist the rare but latent defect. The danger of cousin marriage lies in the probability that the germ-plasm of each individual contains numerous latent defects, each of which is rare in the community at large, and each of which is of small danger to the individual or the offspring unless the mating is with another individual whose germ-plasm contains one or more of the same latent characters. (Elderton 1911: 38)

These “latent defects” included sterility, mental illness, alcoholism, feeble-mindedness, physical deformities, disabilities, dementia, deaf-mutism, myopia and blindness, “deviant” sexuality, and proneness to tuberculosis, syphilis and criminal behavior. Obviously, not all of these conditions are inherited, and those that are may be hidden in “normal-looking” carriers.

The vocabulary and vectors of eugenics were also used to pathologize and contemporize historical constructions of radical otherness, as in the case of *burakumin* and spirit-animal possessors. Their stigmatized status was eugenically respun as the consequence of defective germ-plasm. Curiously, of the several articles I read by eugenicists dismantling superstitions surrounding marriage practices, not one made an argument *against* the systematic discrimination of *burakumin* in all arenas of Japanese society. Moreover, eugenic discourse was instrumental in creating a caste-like category of “stigmatized other.” Not only were those Japanese who exhibited a newly identified hereditary defect ostracized, but their households were also marked as eugenically unfit. Whereas historically, symbolically impure groups were allowed to marry and reproduce among themselves, persons and groups classified as eugenically unfit, such as persons with Hansen’s disease (leprosy), were

quarantined, exiled, and prevented from marrying (unless sterilized) and reproducing.³⁴ Eugenicists such as Taguchi Eitarô expressed alarm that although “genetically defective” and “feeble-minded” individuals constituted only two percent of the population, they reproduced at two to three times the rate of “normal and ordinary” (*futsû*) individuals. Taguchi even invoked Gresham’s Law in arguing for the passage of the 1940 National Eugenics Law (Taguchi 1940: 35).³⁵

The imperial state and its agencies chose early on to pursue a eugenics dictated agenda that called for the eradication of the apparently widespread practice in Japan of consanguineous marriage. Beginning in 1883, numerous “hygiene exhibitions” (*eisei tenrankai*) were staged countrywide, sponsored first by a Buddhist temple, the Hongan-ji in the Tsukiji district of Tokyo, and subsequently by the Japanese Red Cross and, after 1938, by the Welfare Ministry. By the late 1920s, the theme and content of many of these exhibitions were based on public opinion polls; the relationship between heredity and marriage practices proved to be one of the most popular themes (Fujino 1998: 140–141). The sensationalistic and sometimes grotesque exhibits—such as a realistic wax model of a man’s face riddled with syphilitic lesions—along with numerous articles in the popular press, drummed home warnings about the deleterious effects of both unregulated sex and inbreeding. Schoolchildren, along with the general public, were encouraged to attend the lectures that accompanied the exhibitions. Presented by doctors and university professors, these “blood talks” greatly simplified eugenics for the lay public, who apparently attended by the thousands. The speakers harshly censured superstitions and folk customs related to marriage, such as matchmaking based on horoscopy, the sexegenary cycle, and the five elements (wood, fire, water, earth, metal). But their sometimes facile presentations of genetic diseases helped to spawn new superstitions based on popularized science, such as the attribution to consanguinity of a host of non-genetic conditions such as leprosy, tuberculosis, and symbolic pollution and marginality (Fujikawa 1929; Kôseisho eisei kekkon sôdansho 1941; Fujino 1998: 141–142).

EUGENIC MARRIAGES

The tenacious persistence of “blood marriages” despite private and state efforts to condemn their transaction provoked intensified efforts to eliminate that tradition. One of the first lines of offense was the “eugenic-marriage counseling centers” (*yûsei kekkon sôdansho*) that were first opened in Tokyo and regional cities in 1927. The earliest centers were sponsored and staffed by Ikeda’s Japan Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association. A year earlier, Ikeda had founded the Legs Society (*Ashi no kai*) as a means of popularizing eugenic principles. Like the earlier German Wandervogel and Czech Sokol movements that inspired Ikeda, the Legs Society sponsored, through its Tokyo and regional branches, collective hygienic regimens, nutrition lessons, group hiking, and wholesome folk-dancing in the countryside as ways to improve the bodies and minds of young Japanese so that they could “properly oversee the nation’s global expansion” (Ikeda 1927a; Okada 1933; Fujino 1998: 83–86).³⁶

Ikeda regarded the ostracism and sterilization of the unfit a crude and simplistic approach to the project of race betterment. Citing the evolutionary categories proposed by Lewis Henry Morgan in *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity* (1871), Ikeda argued that monogamous marriage practices, together with the systematization of physical education, was the golden key to improving the Japanese race and modernizing Japan (Ikeda 1925: 31–38, 386). Article after article in his journal, *Yûsei Undô*, emphasized that “monogamy was the foundation of eugenics” and that a eugenically sound marriage insured the development of a prosperous, physically fit, and moral society (e.g. Miwata 1927; Ikeda 1929: 19).

Ikeda and his colleagues followed Francis Galton in emphasizing the dialectical relationship between eugenics and marriage:

Eugenic belief extends the function of philanthropy to future generations, it renders its actions more pervading than hitherto, by dealing with families and societies in their entirety, and it enforces the importance of the marriage covenant by directing serious attention to the probable quality of the future offspring... [and] brings the tie of kinship into prominence.... (quoted in Pearson 1909: 45)

Dismissing as bunk the folk belief that the familiarity shared by married blood relatives insured household diplomacy and stability, Ikeda lectured throughout Japan on the need to shift the basis of and for desirable familiarity between females and males from close kinship *per se* to the modern alternative of equal co-education and shared hobbies. In his lectures and essays, Ikeda repeated the slogan of his association, “superior seeds, superior fields, superior cultivation” (*yoi tane, yoi hatake, yoi teire*) which, he explained, was a metaphor for “superior genes (or germ plasm), superior society, superior education” (*yoi iden, yoi shakai, yoi kyōiku*) (Ikeda 1927a). Civic and educational institutions, not consanguineous households, were promoted by him as ideal sites for revising the terms of interpersonal familiarity and ultimately insuring marital success among persons unrelated by blood. Ikeda argued that a desirable intimacy among strangers could be facilitated through educational programs and leisure activities, such as those offered by the Legs Society, that replaced pervasive folk beliefs about “shared blood” as a key criterion of and for affinity and harmony (Fujino 1998: 88).

A number of the eugenic marriage counseling centers, including Ikeda’s, were opened in department stores—such as Shirokiya in the elegant Nihonbashi section of Tokyo—in order to make information about social and race hygiene, and associated behaviors and practices, easily available to consumers. Women especially were targeted, for “female citizenship” was defined not in terms of legal rights but in terms of procreation and consumption (Yūsei kekkon sōdansho annai 1936; Robertson 2001a,b). Modern scientific—specifically hygienic and eugenic—knowledge was dispensed as a commodity. Because consumption was inextricably associated with the body and its cosmetic, nutritional, and sartorial enhancement, the link between women’s consumer citizenship and eugenics was naturalized by the state and commercial sector alike.

The staff of the eugenic-marriage counseling centers also provided matchmaking services, introducing potential spouses to each other based on the autobiographical health certificates they had completed and filed at the centers. According to the health profile (*shinshin kensahyō*) of a eugenic couple appearing in *Shashin Shuhō* (Photograph Weekly) in April 1942, by which time the centers were well established throughout Japan, the ideal woman was 154 cm tall, weighed 51 kg, had a chest size of 80 cm and was 21 years old or younger.³⁷ The ideal man was 165 cm tall, weighed 58 kg, had a chest size of 84 cm and was 25 years old or younger. Both were free from disease and had “normal” genealogies. As the quintessential eugenic couple, they were committed to observing the “ten rules of marriage,” which were: choose a lifetime partner; choose a partner healthy in body and mind; exchange health certificates; choose someone without bad genes; avoid marriage with blood relatives; marry as soon as possible; discard superstitions and quaint customs; obey your parents; have a simple and economical wedding; and, reproduce for the sake of the nation. The health profile was accompanied by photographs of the couple and their health certificates, scenes of a simplified, eugenic marriage ceremony, and a cartoon of the desired outcome of eugenic marriage counseling; namely, a family of eight children (Fig. 2) (Kore kara no kekkon wa kono yō ni 1942: 8–9).

Below the photograph of the ideal bride was the following declaration:

Only people can accomplish the construction of Greater East Asia. Superior (*yūnō*) people are greatly needed for our future. There is one condition that must be fulfilled in order to increase the number of superior people



FIGURE 2 A eugenic couple and their health certificates. Photograph by author of Korekara no kekkon wa kono yô ni (1942: 18–19).

and that is the promotion and encouragement of marriage. For every Japanese child born, seven children are born in China, five in India, and three in the Soviet Union. However important it is to increase the population, the birth of physically weak and mentally impaired children will harm the national body (*kokutai*). Therefore, let us be sure to think carefully about marriage and to transact a wholesome union in order to bring forth superior offspring. Then, in ten or twenty years, the strong children who will lead East Asia will have increased in number to the point where by Shōwa 35 [1970], the population of the main islands (*naichi*) of Japan will have topped 100 million. Is that not a wonderful scenario to contemplate? (Kore kara no kekkon wa kono yō ni 1942: 8)

Center staff also attempted to discourage marriages between Japanese women and Korean men who had been recruited from the peninsula as laborers following its annexation by Japan in 1910. In the ethnocentric words of one survey report, filed in 1942, “the Korean [male] laborers brought to Japan, where they have established permanent residency, are of the lower classes and therefore of an inferior constitution. . . . By fathering children with Japanese women, these men could lower the caliber of the Yamato *minzoku*” (Mizushima and Miyake 1942; see also Satō 1943).

Not only were women the primary audience for eugenic marriage counseling, they were also encouraged early on to undertake meticulous hygienic and eugenic surveillance work in their official gender role of good wife, wise mother. Married women were recruited by eugenicists to undertake the ethnographic surveys of their marital and natal households necessary to establish genealogical, or blood, orthodoxies within families as a foundational step toward race betterment. In 1887, the hygiene section of the Home Ministry established the Greater Japan Women’s Hygiene Association (*Dai nippon fujin eiseikai*) in Tokyo under whose auspices married women in particular were organized as blood-marriage whistleblowers. An Osaka branch was established three years later (Fujino 1998: 388). Encouraged to regard themselves as amateur ethnographers, the women were instructed to collect as much information as possible on the life histories of living and deceased relatives. The households and relatives of prospective marriage partners and their extended families were to be similarly scrutinized in order to prevent inbreeding.

By the early 1930s, detailed “eugenic marriage” questionnaires were printed in or inserted into popular magazines for public consumption, and the accompanying instructions underscored the slippery nature of questionnaires in general. The amateur ethnographers were reminded that because there was often a huge difference between what people say they do and what they actually do, they could not take anything at face value and were obliged to maintain a healthy skepticism (Takada 1986 [1937]: 394, 401, 514). By and large, the questionnaires were designed to foster a modern, anti-traditional attitude of scientific-mindedness.

An exemplary eugenic-marriage questionnaire was published in 1933 in the *Fujin Kōron* (*Women’s Review*), a leading, mainstream women’s magazine. The insert was titled, “A marriage survey that amateurs can undertake” (*shirōto de dekiru kekkon chōsa*). There were nine categories of investigation: personal history; disposition and character; personal conduct; health status; hobbies, tastes, and habits; religious beliefs; political orientation; lifestyle; and financial status. According to the author of the survey, “since females make a career of homemaking, it is not necessary to survey their social relationships [outside of the home]” (Takada 1986 [1937]: 395, 403, 514).³⁸ Thus, whereas males were asked about their “future worldly aspirations,” females were assumed not to have any. Instead, women were questioned as to whether they had any “problems with the concept of wifehood.” The types of wifehood listed to prompt their responses were: good wife, wise mother-type; harlot-type; faithful companion-type; household-type; working wife-type; and, wants-to-be-a-nun-type (Takada 1986 [1937]: 405). Eugenicists may have been gynocentric in select respects but they were not feminists as this questionnaire makes clear, for their aim was not about empowering the agency of females as we understand that concept today, but rather to

rationalize and justify the modern, patriarchal institution of marriage and the unequal sexual division of reproductive labor.

Clearly, the successful completion of these eugenic-household questionnaires was ultimately contingent upon the literacy and diligence of the surveyor; namely, an urban, middle-class educated woman with enough free time to devote to the task. If necessary, however, detective agencies could be commissioned to assist. In fact, one historian of science, Fujino Yutaka, claims that the first detective agencies (*kôshinjo*) were founded in Osaka in 1892 to conduct background checks on potential marriage partners, a service that remains in high use today (Fujino 1998: 392). Eugenicist Ikeda Shigenori, writing in 1928, noted that rapid urbanization and the social confusion it occasioned, called for new strategies of matchmaking, including the use of detective agencies to carry out background and character checks—"it's a welcome sign that they are increasing in number." However, he continued,

detective agencies do not and cannot locate and provide eugenically fit marriage candidates; rather, they only investigate particular individuals already identified as potential spouses. Thus, systematically organized eugenic matchmaking and marriage counseling offices are a necessary social institution. (Ikeda 1928: 59)

Ideally, according to Ikeda, these offices would administer confidential census-like surveys in order to create a database of eugenically fit women and men available for marriage.

The surveys will consist of five categories of information provided by clients: (1) the client's name, age, occupation, height, chest diameter, weight, general health, educational history, talents, hobbies, siblings, income, and photograph; (2) the client's description of an ideal spouse, including age, occupation, health, social status (*mibun*), income, and so forth; (3) the client's parents: father's name, age, occupation, health, siblings, hobbies; mother's name, age, occupation, health, siblings, economic history, hobbies; and the present circumstances of both; (4) the same details for the client's paternal and maternal grandparents, including the cause of death if deceased; and (5) a list of the names of the client's primary [i.e. blood] relatives. The office staff will solicit further information from the client and others on the client's bloodline (*kettô*), [his or her] household's character (*iegara*), and [his or her family's] genetic (*iden*) makeup. These surveys will be kept confidential; actual names will be substituted with pseudonyms when providing spouse-seekers with copies of the documents to peruse. The actual names will be released to both parties only when an arranged marriage meeting is formalized. (Ikeda 1928: 59–60)

Ikeda was convinced that these marriage surveys would not only insure the eugenic fitness of spouses but also help avoid class differences that could disrupt and even destroy a marriage. Moreover, he explained, the surveys would be augmented by information from a eugenic couple's children. Ultimately, the goal was to create a database of individuals and their entire households—and ultimately "all Japanese households"—which would enable eugenicists to conduct in-depth surveys of any given family's genealogy (*kakei*) (Ikeda 1928: 61). Because, Ikeda declared, the government did not yet have an institutional framework for administering a comprehensive eugenic marriage counseling office—the Welfare Ministry was established in 1938—the Japan Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association was prepared to undertake this service (Ikeda 1928: 61). Ikeda's association took the lead in 1928 by declaring 21 December "blood-purity day" (*junketsu dê*) and sponsoring free blood tests at the Tokyo Hygiene Laboratory. Two thousand persons, mostly women (wives and daughters), were tested by early afternoon, and a second day of free tests was offered on 26 December to accommodate the crowds, whose presence was construed by Ikeda as evidence of the popular acceptance of eugenic precepts (Shimin no junketsu dê 1928).

Ikeda's eugenic marriage counseling activities, which included the "mixers" sponsored by the Legs Society, "blood-purity" testing clinics, the eugenic-marriage questionnaires, and the public hygiene exhibitions among other things, illustrate the extent to which scientific culture was popularized and popular culture "scientized" by social engineers keen on modifying and modernizing the behavior of the Japanese people. Additionally, articles and advice columns on eugenic themes appeared frequently in national daily newspapers and popular magazines.

Eugenicists contributed regularly to the media, and the eugenics journals *Jinsei-Der Mensch*, *Yûsei*, *Yûsei Undô*, and *Yûseigaku* all included columns and articles devoted to summarizing the coverage of eugenics themes in the daily press (e.g. Shinbun ni arawareta yûsei mondai 1936a,b).

EUGENIC MARRIAGES AS NATIONAL STRATEGY

In addition to concerns, real and imagined, about the negative consequences of inbreeding among blood relatives, it occurred to me that the state—that is, the repertoire of agencies and institutions that reinforces and reproduces dominant ideologies and normalizes everyday practices (cf. Corrigan and Sayer 1985)—had another investment in the eradication of consanguineous marriages. What eugenics offered was a motive and rationale for the imperial state to more closely engineer and orchestrate the sexual, gendered, marital, and reproductive practices of its subjects. Nation-states have always maintained a vested interest in the sexual and social reproduction of the population, and New Japan was no different in this regard. In fact, in some respects, the imperial state was following a powerful precedent set by the Tokugawa shogunate, which had brokered and controlled all marriages and adoptions among the vassal daimyo as one means of insuring their subordination.

The imperial state differed from this precedent in two major ways. First, the patrilineal orthodoxy undergirding the Tokugawa regime extended to the prevailing ethno-embryology, which is best described as male monogenesis, or the notion that the female body serves as a vessel to contain the active life-producing agent supplied by the male alone. With the popularization of eugenics came an explanation of sexual reproduction that emphasized the critical and equal contributions of females and males to heredity. The imperial state thus recognized the importance taking both maternity and paternity into account in promoting the creation of New Japanese despite the persistence of patrilineality as the singular criterion of nationality and citizenship.

The second major difference between the Tokugawa regime and the imperial state was the global scope of the underlying ideological agenda of New Japan, which was informed by the utopian ideology of the family-state system that characterized Japanese nationalism. By promoting eugenic marriages, the imperial state and its agents aimed to redefine historical and traditional boundaries of endogamy (*dôzoku kekkon*) and exogamy (*zokugai kekkon*). The state sought to replace one type of kin group endogamy with another system that I shall call “eugenic endogamy,” which basically amounted to the introduction of “universal exogamy” among theoretically pure-blooded Japanese. Eugenic endogamy in short, was at the foundation of the family-state system, or state familism. In seeking to instill in its subjects an awareness of the New Japan and their Japanese nationality, the state aimed to dissolve the boundaries that engendered local affinities—boundaries that were intricately shaped by historical and traditional endogamous practices based on kin group, pedigree, class, region, and “superstitions and folk beliefs.”

An article published in 1889, in the journal of the Great Japan Association for the Betterment of Public Customs and Morals (Dainippon fûzoku kairyôkai), is one of the earliest calls for the practice of universal exogamy in Japan. In it, the author drew attention to the allegedly higher percentage of deformities and mortality among the offspring of couples related by blood.³⁹ Citing and agreeing with Katô Hiroyuki’s opposition to “mixed marriages,” the author recommended what they termed both *shûshi kôkan*, or “exchange of seeds,” and *man’en kekkon*, or “marriage between widely dispersed individuals”:

marriages partners should be selected not from the narrow parameters of blood relatives within a village or circumscribed regions, but from all over Japan. A man from Satsuma [in the south] should marry a woman

from the north; a woman from Shikoku [in the south] should marry a man from Niigata [in the north].
(Sakamoto 1889: 8)

Forty years later, Ikeda Shigenori reiterated the pressing need for a new geography of marriage in his arguments for the establishment of eugenic matchmaking centers, which would have the effect of “greatly expanding the circle (*han'i*) of eligible spouses” (Ikeda 1928: 60).

From a perspective *inside* Japan, universal exogamy was advocated; from a vantage point *outside* of Japan, eugenic or national endogamy was promoted—that is, the principle that Japanese should marry other pure-blooded Japanese comprising the imaginary national family based on eugenic criteria that replaced traditional endogamous practices. Limited exceptions were also made for politically strategic purposes, such as arranged marriages between members of the Japanese aristocracy and their Korean, Manchurian, and Mongolian counterparts. Arguments in favor of so-called “mixed-blood marriages” and “hybrid vigor” continued as part of the public discourse of eugenics, and have remained a foil for assertions today about the cultural and racial uniqueness of *the* Japanese.

EPILOGUE

I have reviewed the Japanese ideologies of blood that came into prominence in the twinned contexts of nation-building and imperialism. The Japanese people themselves were the proving ground of colonialist schemes in Asia and the Pacific for the reason that they needed to be claimed and remolded as a national community and recruited into the imperial enterprise as a supporting cast. The popularization of eugenics, race hygiene, and eugenic endogamy as elements of quotidian life was a (bio)powerfully effective method of national mobilization. In Japan, ideologies of blood vacillated between the two incommensurable theoretical positions of pure-bloodedness and mix-bloodedness. Scrutinized from another perspective, we can see that these positions themselves were premised on competing notions of either the vigor or the vulnerability of *the* Japanese as agents of cultural encounter and transformation.

These positions were also refracted in the condemnation of consanguineous marriages and the promotion of universal exogamy within Japan among pure-blooded Japanese. The tension between these positions persists today in many popular forums.⁴⁰ Manichaean arguments are waged in the mass media about whether or not the Japanese were imperialist aggressors, anti-colonial liberators of Asia, or victims of Western imperialism—tautological and essentially moot arguments that, since 1945, have worked to erode memories and records alike of tangible historical events. Scientists have been no less willfully amnesiac: Matsunaga Ei, a geneticist writing in 1968 on birth control policy in Japan, made the preposterous and fallacious claim that “no eugenic movement has ever existed in this country” (Matsunaga 1968: 199). Similarly, postwar demographers and biologists writing on consanguineous marriages in Japan somehow overlook or ignore the active role of the state and eugenics associations in fostering a negative image of inbreeding and instead attribute the decline in such marriages to an agentless “loss of traditional values” (Schull and Neel 1965: 19). Moreover, the journal *Minzoku Eisei* (Race Hygiene), launched in 1931, continues to be published, despite the disturbingly fascist allusions of the title.

It is clear that eugenic formulations—“blood talks”—about Japanese nationality remain suspended in a *continuous present* where they shape and support political social, cultural, and aesthetic perceptions of ethnic and racial identity.⁴¹ Only by recognizing and researching historical patterns of social engineering and nation-building, and only by remaining alert to their contemporization and to the continuous presence of their past, can we begin to frame

a critical discourse of first- and second-wave eugenics both relevant to Japan and possessing comparative potential.

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Notes

1. A more literal translation is, “As for blood, [it] expresses things.”
2. The slash in the translated title, while awkward, reflects the fact that *undô* refers to both exercise, as in athletics, and movement, as in activities organized toward a specific political objective. Born in January 1892 in Nikaho town (Yuri district, Akita prefecture), Ikeda Shigenori attended college in Tokyo. Following his graduation from Tokyo Foreign Language University (Tokyo Gaigodai), he was employed by Kôdansha, a prominent publishing house, to edit the magazine *Taikan* (Outlook). He later joined the *Hôchi Shinbun*, a major daily newspaper, and served as a special correspondent to Germany from 1919 to 1924, where he earned doctorates in eugenics and women’s history. He was transferred to Moscow in 1925 before returning to Japan and founding the Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association and a eugenics journal, both of which were aimed to foster among the general public an interest in incorporating hygienic and eugenic practices into everyday life practices. The journal ceased publication in January 1930. Ikeda rekindled his journalism career the following year by assuming the editorship of the *Keijô Nippô* (Seoul Daily News) based in Seoul, Korea. He returned to the *Hôchi Shinbun* as an editor in 1938, and from 1941 through the end of the war worked for Naval Intelligence (Kaigun hôdôbu). After the war he became a prominent “social commentator” (*hyôronka*), known for his entertaining essays on a wide array of topics, from the origins of sushi and Japanese photography, to canine welfare in different cultures and the fate of Japanese *konketsuji* (“mixed-blood children”) (Ikeda 1956; 1957).
3. “Disciplinary bio-power,” as elaborated by Michel Foucault (1978; 1979), refers to a state’s or dominant institution’s politicization of and control over biology and biological processes, including

recreational and procreational sexual practices, as a powerful means of assimilating and claiming people as subjects. Although the applications of bio-power can be both positive or negative, Foucault focuses especially on its the misuses and perversions.

4. This article is part of a much longer chapter in my book-in-progress, *Beauty and Blood: Cultures of Japanese Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press). The chapter includes material on imperial assimilation policy as a technology of “blood,” which I did not have the space to include here.
5. Jennifer Terry makes a similar point about the relationship between science and (homo)sexuality in the United States (Terry 1999: 11–13).
6. Beginning in the 1910s and blatantly obvious by 1940 was the prolific use of *kagaku* (science) in the titles of popular magazines, such as *Kagaku Sekai* (Science World), *Kagaku Gahô* (Science Illustrated), *Kodomo no Kagaku* (Science for Children), *Kagaku no Nippon* (Science Japan), and *Shashin Kagaku* (Photography Science), to name but a few magazines.
7. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, “the imagery of the family was particularly apposite because it created the ideal framework for asserting the paramount place of the emperor in Japanese society” as the head of the family-state. The familial conception of the nation-state profoundly influenced the nascent idea of the uniqueness of *the Japanese* as a distinct race (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 84–85).
8. Until 1985, paternal “blood,” or patrilineality, was the *de jure* condition of nationality and citizenship, which in Japan, as in Germany, is *jus sanguinus* (unlike in the United States, where it is *jus solis*). That year, maternal “blood” was legally recognized as an agent of nationality and citizenship.
9. Historically, in some regions of Japan females were required to spend the period of their menses in a menstrual hut located at some remove from the main house (Segawa 1963). Many Japanese today are reluctant to acknowledge the equation of blood and symbolic pollution as one factor influencing the widespread corporate practice of allowing (until a few years ago) monthly “menstruation leaves.” Today, Shinto priests rationalize as a precautionary measure, the banishment of all females, regardless of celebrity or political rank, from the sumo ring, certain sacred mountains, and road construction sites on account of their polluted and dangerous bodies that can provoke destructive forces.
10. Jesuit missionaries from Portugal traveled to Japan via China in the late sixteenth century, and were among the first European “anthropologists” of that country (Cooper 1965).
11. Note that *niku*, as in *nikumanjû* (flesh bun), has been a slang word for female genitals since at least the early seventeenth century (Maeda 1979: 757). There is no apparent vulgar equivalent for *tane*.
12. The history of “blood” symbolism in Japan runs contrary to Foucault’s eurocentric theory that an “ancient regime of blood” endured as a descent ideology forming the foundation of a modern racist and racialist system of heredity. Moreover, in modern Japan, “blood” symbolism was collapsed with, and not replaced by, sexuality and race (Foucault 1978: 147–148; see the discussion with respect to Germany in Linke 1999: 36–37).
13. Although Lebra here is referring in particular to the adoption practices of the modern Japanese nobility (which she presents in terms somewhat timeless), adoption was deployed pragmatically by all classes and status groups since at least the fourth century, when Japan first appears in Chinese dynastic histories. The *ie*, or household, is a corporate group and an economic unit of production that perpetuates itself from generation to generation beyond the life span of any single member of the group. Prior to the postwar constitution, the *ie*, and not the individual, constituted the smallest legal unit of society. The *ie*, which is lead by a househead who is regarded as the caretaker of the group, may vary over time in composition from a childless couple to several generations, although only one married couple per generation may claim membership in an *ie*. As I note in the body of the article, succession tends to be on the model of male primogeniture; younger sons form branch *ie* and daughters marry out.
14. Also, wealthy merchants, who controlled the *de facto* monetary economy during the Edo period, could purchase swords that only samurai could, theoretically, own and which, therefore, were akin to sartorial markers of samurai status.
15. Two years earlier, the Association together with the Japanese Red Cross designated 11 November as “the day to emphasize the importance of marriage” (*kekkon kyôchôbi*). As explained by eugenicist Nagai Hisomu, the Chinese characters for the number 11 resemble the character for

- “soil,” itself a metaphor for blood as an organic, generative power (Nagai 1936: 8; also cited in Otsubo 1999: 68). Nagai, who had studied at Göttingen University from 1903 to 1906, was very likely familiar with the Germanic idea of kinship originating in the commingling of blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*), later reified by the Nazis, as suggested by his reference to “beautiful flowers growing from [Japanese] soil.”
16. For a description of one aspect of the application of eugenics by women’s groups, see Otsubo (1999). Curiously, Otsubo does not seem aware of the relationship between an ideology of pure-bloodedness, discussed here in detail later, and ideas of race hygiene and fears associated with miscegenation. Consequently, she limits notions of blood purity to the literal (non-allegorical) sense of disease- or pathogen-free hemoglobin. After WWII, Nagai distanced himself from his earlier work as an enthusiastic advocate of negative eugenics (see Frühstück 2002).
 17. The association of eugenics with maternal health has overshadowed its invocation as scientific grounds for the ostracism, exile, and even sterilization of persons suffering from Hansen’s disease and other conditions erroneously assumed to be genetic who were thus treated as pariahs.
 18. Early in the Tokugawa period, the Tokugawa shogunate codified a status hierarchy that classified people into four endogamous groups—samurai (*shi*), farmers (*nô*), artisans (*kô*), and merchants (*shô*). Above these groups were the members of the imperial household and the Buddhist and Shinto clergy, and below the four groups were people grouped into two categories of sub-humanity, the “non-people” (*hinin*) and, at rock bottom, the “filthy” (non-) people (*eta*). The *hinin* constituted a heterogeneous group comprised of beggars, prostitutes, itinerant entertainers, fortunetellers, fugitives, and criminals. Among their ranks were also individuals who had fallen out of the “real people” categories for one reason or another. *Eta* is a word of uncertain origin. In the Tokugawa period, it referred to families of outcastes who performed tasks considered to be ritually or symbolically polluting, including the slaughtering of animals and disposal of the dead. The *eta* were “quarantined” in specific, undesirable locations, such as dry river beds, and forced to wear special clothing to mark their outcaste status; in some localities were mandated to wear a patch of leather on their sleeves, whereas in others, they were tattooed, as were some *hinin*. In 1871, as part of its modernization programs, the new Meiji imperial government, whose supporters overthrew the shogunate, passed an edict officially abolishing all status discrimination. The four-part status hierarchy was leveled and reconstituted under the rubric “commoners” (*heimin*)—although aristocrats remained such. The non-people and *eta* were recategorized as “new commoners” (*shinheimin*), whose creation marks the beginning of the *burakumin*, or literally “village people,” a Meiji-period name that emphasized their endogamous constitution. Moreover, the prefix “new,” in “new commoner,” did not eradicate but rather contemporized the centuries long practice of discriminating against persons historically categorized as subhuman.
 19. The blurred semantics of “eugenics” and “race hygiene” also typified debates about “applied biology” in Germany before and during the Third Reich; see Proctor (1988).
 20. *Jinshu* is the Chinese-style (*onyomi*) pronunciation of this compound ideograph; the Japanese-style (*kunyomi*) pronunciation is *hitodane*, or “human seed.” My perusal of the early eugenics literature suggests that *hitodane* was the pronunciation used for the English term “germ plasm,” as indicated by the frequent inclusion of syllables [*furigana*] printed alongside the ideographs in texts. Also, whereas *jinshu* is used for “race” in the biological (phenotypic) sense, *minzoku* more often denotes social race, or ethnicity.
 21. Embree (1939: 88–89) suggests, without substantiation, that consanguineous marriages tended to involve patrilineal cross-cousins while adoptions tended to be transacted within matrilineages.
 22. For definitive research on the history of sexology in Japan, see Frühstück (2001; 2003).
 23. Among the most tenacious superstitions is that of the *hinoeuma*, or zodiacal sign of the fiery horse that cycles every sixty years. Females born in the year of the fiery horse are, according to this “superstition,” headstrong and predestined to harm males, and thus are eschewed as marriage partners.
 24. Having published already on the vicissitudes of the “pure-blood” and “mixed-blood” positions, I will only briefly summarize them here in order to reduce redundancy and to allow more room to explore related phenomena; see Robertson (2001a).
 25. “Marriage” was used as a euphemism for “procreative sexual intercourse.”
 26. Michael Weiner (1997: 7) states incorrectly that Takahashi’s ideas were shared by Katô.

27. Incidentally, Baelz himself did not support mixed-blood marriages, and proposed instead a “negative” eugenics approach to race betterment by segregating the fit from the unfit (Fujino 1998: 388). He did not follow his own advice, however, and married a Japanese woman, Hana, with whom he had two children. Similar arguments about the pros and cons of the pure-blood and mixed-blood positions were waged in China, where one advocate of mixed marriages attempted to strengthen his case by claiming that the Japanese government had sanctioned the practice of intermarriage between “whites” and “yellows,” which of course was not accurate (Dikötter 1992: 88); see also Dikötter (1998) for general information about the discourse of race and eugenics in China. Although aware of their Chinese counterparts, a number of whom visited and studied in Japan, Japanese eugenicists did not cite their work, favoring instead the publications of Europeans and North and South Americans. Doubtless Japanese imperial aggression in China since the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) also had a negative effect on scholarly exchanges between Japanese and Chinese nationalists and eugenicists. See also Stefan Tanaka (1993) for an informative analysis of the status of China in Japanese scholarship during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ann Stoler’s perceptive article on the cultural politics of “mixed bloods” in French Indochina and Netherlands East Indies offers useful comparative material. However, she neither mentions nor addresses the influence of the international discourse eugenics and race hygiene on French and Dutch colonial administrators, and glosses specific and distinctive French and Dutch colonial strategies as “European.” Perhaps their eschewal of miscegenation justifies their melding here, but the notion of an internally coherent “Europe” is problematic. Where, for example, do Spain and Portugal fit within the rubric “Europe,” two arguably “European” colonial powers that *did* pursue miscegenation as a means of assimilation? The argument against miscegenation made by the Dutch legalist J.A. Nederburgh in 1898 parallels Katô’s argument, made twelve years earlier, for preserving the purity of Japanese blood. It would have been interesting to know from what body of literature and contemporary debates Nederburgh was drawing (Stoler 1995: 138). As an aside, Japanese writers apparently enjoyed musing about the conceptual problems associated with and the fate of “Dutch mixed-bloods” (e.g. Daitôaken no bunkateki shomondai 1942; Kitahara 1943; Ôya 1943).
28. One of the main vehicles for popularizing eugenics among the *fin-de-siècle* Japanese public was the journal *Jinsei* (Human Life), founded in 1905 by Fujikawa Yû, an internist and medical historian. It was discontinued in 1919. Fujikawa was among the dozens of Japanese medical students who studied in Germany at the turn of the century and who were keen on applying European ideas about eugenics and race hygiene to the general project of “improving the Japanese race.” *Jinsei*, subtitled *Der Mensch* (The Human), was modeled after German eugenicist Alfred Ploetz’s *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie* (*Journal for Racial and Social Biology*) founded a year earlier. The contents were divided into sixteen categories which reflected the prevailing synthesis of Darwinian and Lamarckian theories and assumptions: biology, social anthropology, historical anthropology, physical anthropology, legal anthropology, comparative psychology, psychology, national psychology, cultural history of medicine, social hygiene, race hygiene, law, sociology, education and pedagogy, religion, and statistics.
29. Years earlier, some colonial administrators had considered a similar policy with respect to Korea and Koreans under the tautological rubric *dôbun dôshu no minzoku*, or “people of the same culture and race”—“tautological” because the alleged sameness was proposed by Japanese colonial ideologues who supported assimilation, or *dôka*, literally “same-ization,” that is, Japanization. Support for assimilation and pacification through intermarriage waned as Korean hostility toward the occupiers grew more intense, especially after the anti-Japanese uprising of 1919. The very few “mixed marriages” that were officially condoned were those strategically arranged between Japanese and Korean royalty (Duus 1995: 413–23). Ijichi’s views paralleled the dominant position of the state’s assimilation policy toward the aboriginal Ainu of Hokkaido, who, since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, had been categorized as “proto-Japanese.” Assimilation, it was believed, would accelerate their evolution as “civilized people” (e.g. Takakura 1942).
30. Although published in 1945, Tôgô here reiterates a eugenic argument first made in his books on colonial administration published two decades earlier (e.g. Tôgô 1922; 1925).

31. Similar events, such as “better baby contests” were staged in early twentieth-century United States at state fairs and other public forums.
32. Females averaged 11.9 years of age, 156 cm in height, and 45 kg in weight. The respective statistics for males were 11.10 years, 158 cm, and 46.5 kg (Kenkō yūryōji 1930: 8–9).
33. Another term used for consanguineous marriage was *kinshin kekkon*, or “marriage between close relatives.” Beardsley *et al.* (1959: 323); and Embree (1939: 24–28, 88–89) suggest that patrilineal parallel cousin marriages were typical, while Joy Hendry (1981: 124–125) indicates that there was no preference for either parallel or cross cousins noting that first-cousin marriages have been discouraged since the end of WWII. All suggest that consanguineous marriages likely forged easier and closer household ties.
34. The Leprosy Prevention Law was formulated and informally activated in 1907, formally adopted in 1953, and abolished in 1996. In the spring of 2001, the Kumamoto District Court ruled that the government should pay 1.82 billion yen in reparations to the plaintiffs. For various reasons, the government of Prime Minister Koizumi decided not to appeal the ruling [Oba 1996; Kakuchi 1998; Schriener 2001], although it remains to be seen how the former exiles will be “repatriated.”
35. Gresham’s Law refers to an observation in economics that “when two coins are equal in debt-paying value but unequal in intrinsic value, the one having the lesser intrinsic value tends to remain in circulation and the other to be hoarded or exported as bullion” (Gresham’s Law 1985: 536). A brief word about blood-type is a useful here in connection with overlapping notions of blood and purity. Although today the pseudo-scientific fiction that the Japanese constitute a “blood-type A race” is widely invoked in the mass media, knowledge about specific blood-types was not deployed as a eugenic tool in the discourse of race betterment. There were competing attempts among Japanese scientists to classify the so-called races of the world on the basis of the pattern of distribution of the A, O, B, and AB blood types. However, unlike in Nazi Germany, a specific race was not singled out for isolation and extermination in a diabolical scheme to purify “Japanese blood.” By the same token, comparatively few involuntary sterilizations were performed in Japan following the passage of the National Eugenics Law in 1940. Between 1941 and 1945, 15,219 persons (6,399 females and 8,820 males) were targeted for involuntary sterilization, of which 435 persons (243 females and 192 males), or about twenty-nine percent, were actually sterilized, over half of whom were women (Suzuki 1983: 166; Tanaka 1994: 164). From 1955 to 1967 in Japan, about 9,500 persons, two-thirds of whom were female, were involuntarily sterilized; about 432,000 persons, 97% percent of whom were female, underwent voluntary sterilization during this time (Health and Welfare Statistics Association 1987: 104). From 1907 to 1957, over 60,000 persons (more than half females) were sterilized in the United States. One ultranationalist Japanese critic of sterilization argued that the “divine origins” and purity of the “Yamato race” raised serious philosophical doubts about the validity of that procedure: “one must not,” he asserted, “equate a divine people with livestock” (Makino 1938: 18–21; see also Suzuki 1983: 163, and Takagi 1993: 46). Moreover, the militarily strategic need to raise the population by one-third in twenty years, from 73 to 100 million persons, together with an emphasis on bigger, taller bodies over enhanced intellectual ability, effectively diminished support for sterilization as a eugenic strategy (Suzuki 1983: 162–163; Takagi 1993: 46). Other wartime critics of sterilization, such as sexologist Yasuda Tokutarō, stressed instead the importance of the physical and social environment on human development and also the complexity of human motives to reproduce or not (Suzuki 1983: 162–3).
36. Unlike the Wandervogel and Sokol movement that inspired it, the Legs Society was a coed organization from the start. The Wandervogel was later absorbed into the Hitlerjugend.
37. This ideal female body was somewhere between the measurements of the 1931 Miss Nippon and her “average” counterpart. Miss Nippon was nearly 159 cm in height compared to the average female’s 148.5 cm, her chest measured 79 cm compared to the average female’s 74 cm, and she weighed 52.5 kg, compared to the average female’s 46.5 kg (Robertson 2001a: 23–24).
38. Takada put class ideology over actuality, for girls and women were the primary workforce in factories and in the new urban service sector.
39. The author, Sakamoto Shunpū, was the Akita prefecture correspondent for the Great Japan Association for the Betterment of Public Customs and Morals.

40. Space precludes me from discussing these here; they are included in my book-in-progress noted earlier.
41. Similarly, Uli Linke argues that in contemporary Germany, “a retrograde archaism of national state culture is continuously repositioned in the present” (Linke 1999: 239).

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