

DEHISTORICIZING HISTORY

The Ethical Dilemma of “East Asian Bioethics”

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ABSTRACT: This article traces the unsettling history behind the concept of “East Asian bioethics,” a term coined in the mid 1990s, and raises questions about processes of history-making (and -unmaking) in bioethical debates. A barometer of sociopolitical attitudes and orientations, bioethics poses reflexive questions about cultural, national, and global identity. The century-old janusian relationship between eugenics and bioethics continues to inform the popular perception of the nature and future of postmodern Japan, which since the mid 1990s has been shaped by an asymmetrical and ahistorical celebration of pan-Asianism. The bioethical dilemma posed and produced by a politics of renewal and strategic “dehistoricization,” together with “reasianization,” is introduced and analyzed.

Introduction

Defining bioethics, namely, the study of ethical issues associated with biology and medicine, seems to be easier than agreeing upon the criteria and guidelines for the ethical use of biomedical procedures and technologies, which are being developed faster than the new epistemologies necessary to even comprehend them. The word itself was coined in 1970 by the late oncologist Van Potter, who conceptualized bioethics as a comprehensive field of thought and action: Biology combined with diverse humanistic knowledge forging a science that sets a system of medical and environmental priorities for acceptable survival.¹ The first topics problematized in bioethics were the “new biology and its genetic implications, organ transplantation and experimentation with human subjects.”² By the 1990s, questions about what constituted bioethical knowledge and priorities began to emerge in the literature. Discontent with the hitherto dominant

emphasis in bioethics of Euro-American “principlism,” specifically the focus on individual autonomy and regulatory frameworks, accompanied the developing global consciousness of bioethics and “critiques from within” were joined by “critiques from without,” including Japan.³

In the paragraphs that follow, I trace the past and present of bioethical discourse in Japan and the invention, in the mid-1990s, of “East Asian bioethics.”

Potter’s book *Bioethics: The Bridge to the Future*, which was translated into Japanese in 1974 — the first of hundreds of non-Japanese works on bioethics to be translated—influenced the inauguration in 1978 of the bimonthly Seminar Committee on Ethics and Philosophy in Medicine, Kitazato University, which is devoted to bioethical issues in health care.⁴ This was followed by a short-lived study group on “medical ethics” for the twenty-first century organized between 1983 and 1986 at Tokyo University under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. The first, now “classic,” introduction to bioethics was published during that period in Japanese by a science journalist: Yonemoto Shōhei’s *Baioeshikkusu* (Bioethics);⁵ Waseda University professor Kimura Rihito followed in 1987 with *Inochi o kangaeru: baioeshikkusu no susume* (Thinking about life: the progress of bioethics). Recently, in recognition of its theoretically totalizing scope, several Japanese scholars have defined bioethics as “the study of life and death,” and in 2003, the recently founded Institute of Death and Life Studies at Tokyo University inaugurated a new publication, *The Journal of Death and Life*.⁶ Also in 2003, an interdisciplinary bioethics unit, the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Law, was established at Tokyo University, funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Center programs were open to the public in September 2004, marking the emergence of bioethics as a major priority in Japanese society, a development already evident in the publishing world, where hundreds more articles and books were produced in 2000 than had been produced in 1999.⁷ The surge of public curiosity about biotechnology, genetic engineering and bioethics has also produced a new breed of celebrities, including the limbless author and disability-rights activist Ototake Hirota, whose book *Gotai fumanzoku* (Imperfect body) was a runaway bestseller in 1999, and the bioethicist and writer Morioka Masahiro, who directs the on-line International Network for Life Studies, which he founded in 1999.⁸ The site, which is also dedicated to a “critique of civilization,” includes the prolific Morioka’s “personal diary” and English translations of most of his books and articles.⁹

The close developmental ties between medical ethics and bioethics often result in the conflation of the two, a situation perhaps most obvious in the heated public debates on brain death in Japan in the mid-1980s, which were provoked, perhaps ironically, by advances in biotechnology that greatly reduced the rate of mortality associated with organ transplant surgery.¹⁰ However, as Potter emphasized early on, bioethics is more than medical ethics. Bioethics can — must — also be understood as a barometer of the general state of, in this case, Japanese ideas and ideologies, dominant values and beliefs, collective self-knowledge, and understanding of other societies and cultures. It thus follows that a close reading of the history of ethical thinking about life and things biological, which

in Japan as elsewhere predated the coinage of “bioethics,” alerts us to such reflexive questions as: Who are we? What have we become? What do we know? and Where are we going in a greatly changed and changing society and world?¹¹

My research strongly suggests that these kinds of reflexive questions were first posed in the context of the eugenics movement of the late nineteenth century when the ethics of “applied biology” was informed by the demographic priorities of the Japanese empire.¹² The defeat by imperial sympathizers of the 250-year military rule of the Tokugawa shogunate enabled the restoration of the Meiji emperor in 1867 to a ruling position within a parliamentary system. An imperial policy of selective and controlled Westernization was introduced together with unprecedented social reforms. These included the joint institutionalization in the Civil Code of monogamy and the patriarchal household, which was designated the smallest legal unit of society. Beginning with the colonization of Okinawa in 1874, the state consolidated through military force a vast Asian-Pacific domain, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*dai-tōa kyōeiken*) — a rubric coined in August 1940. In Japan, eugenics fueled an ambitious national campaign to grow the population from roughly 70 million to 100 million persons. There was a need to “propagate and multiply” (*umeyo fuyaseyo*) taller and heavier Japanese bodies that could “properly oversee the nation’s global expansion.”¹³ The new, fin de siècle science of eugenics or *yūseigaku* in Japanese, literally “the study of superior birth,” stimulated widespread debate about the efficacy of applying eugenics as social, national, and colonial policy. Eugenics was popularized countrywide through the mass media and various public forums, including traveling exhibitions, better baby contests, and eugenic marriage counseling centers located in department stores.¹⁴

Because of its fundamental connection to issues of life (birth) and death, I argue that eugenics was the premier category within which an emergent bioethics, or *seimei rinri* (life ethics), was subsumed, a relationship that over time inverted so that today, eugenics is a subcategory or variant of bioethics. This may also turn out to be the case elsewhere as well; the regular publication of “pro” eugenics articles in Anglophone bioethics journals, such as Savulescu,¹⁵ suggests this same trajectory. Its close association with maternal health helps explain why in Japan today (unlike in Germany, Israel, and the United States), “eugenics” is neither an avoided nor negatively charged term.¹⁶ To summarize: bioethics emerged in Japan in tandem with the eugenics movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a critical part of the discursive formation of a new, modern Japanese cultural and national identity, debates that continue to inform the popular perception of the nature and future of post-modern Japan. Eugenics and bioethics therefore are neither separate nor isolable phenomena; rather, they are most accurately understood as constituting a janusian category.

History-Making and Bioethics

Recently, Robert Baker, paraphrasing Thomas Kuhn, has called for a concept of bioethics informed by a historical analysis of moral change. In critiquing the “sterility of the ahistorical, rationalist applied ethics model of bioethics em-

braced by standard bioethics textbooks,” which present bioethical dilemmas as essentially insoluble or deadlocked, Baker argues that a focus on the “history of successful and failed attempts to negotiate moral change” would demonstrate the many ways in which morality and conceptions of ethical behavior have been constantly negotiated and normalized over time.¹⁷ Baker further argues that the “phenomenon of justificatory variation tends to subvert rationalist accounts of morality” and that “what unsettles rationalists is the implication that norms may be accepted on grounds that are *independent* of the reasons given to justify them” (emphasis in original).¹⁸

Baker’s focus is on the history of applications of moral philosophy to “real world” medical dilemmas. “Bioethics,” however, is left self-evident, or at certain junctions conflated with “medical morality,” which Baker argues is genealogically connected most directly to Thomas Percival’s prototypical concept of “medical ethics,” coined at the turn of the nineteenth century as an expression of “applied moral philosophy.”¹⁹ Baker offers a definition of “bioethics” as an interdisciplinary field that *should* involve the analysis of moral change and by the same token incorporate “the history of multifaceted relations between moral philosophy and practical limits.”²⁰

I follow Baker in emphasizing the necessary incorporation of historical inquiry into bioethics in order to demonstrate that the world of bioethics is one of continual debate and negotiation about moral perspectives on applications of biomedical technologies. Unlike Baker, however, I explore actual modes of history-making and historical analysis and the nature of their relationship to bioethics and emergent categories of bioethics²¹ — or, the bioethics enterprise. In this connection, Martin Pernick rightly asserts that “[b]ecause past values often differed from current values,” they are “easier to recognize, and can be used to help illuminate the hidden evaluations in ordinary medicine today.”²²

However, as I will argue in the case of Japan, because certain predominant past values, such as paternalism, have been buried along with other historical realities, such as Japanese imperialism, they do not illuminate hidden evaluations. I further suggest that those same past values are always in the process of being contemporized and recuperated, and, in the process, dehistoricized and decontextualized. In other words, past values are precisely what remain hidden — hidden in the light as it were, so ubiquitous today that their historicity is invisible and unacknowledged. This is how, I suggest, ideologies such as paternalism have become reified, in this case, as metaphors of and for Japanese culture, if not as Japanese culture itself. Through an exploration of the modes of history-making, I wish to extract those past values from their perpetually luminous sanctuary in and of the present and to re-situate them in their primary (original) context, so as to determine how they continue to shape, subvert, and camouflage bioethical discourse and its historical precedents. I wish to draw attention to a seeming paradox: namely, that both the invocation *and* erasure of history by Japanese scientists (eugenicists) and bioethicists past and present are examples of “history as constant renewal” involving the deployment of what I call *strategic dehistoricization*. This tendency to “renew” or “dehistoricize” history underscores the highly problematic nature of a singular, holistic East Asian

bioethics promoted today by certain Japanese (e.g., Sakamoto Hyakudai and Hattori Kenji) and non-Japanese (e.g., Frank Leavitt) bioethicists who are prominent and regular participants in international bioethics activities.²³ What follows are “case studies” of history as renewal, and renewal as a mode of history-making.

Politics of Renewal

In a 1968 paper on birth control policy published in English in the *Japanese Journal of Human Genetics*, geneticist Matsunaga Ei (b. 1922) declared that “no eugenic[s] movement has ever existed in Japan.” He also alluded to the 1948 Eugenic Protection Law (Yūsei Hogohō) as “the first of its kind.”²⁴ (In the 1980s, Matsunaga headed the National Institute of Genetics, during which time [1983-89] he established the DNA Data Bank.) Not only was there a vibrant eugenics movement in Japan in the early twentieth century, but the 1948 Eugenic Protection Law was in fact a modification of its predecessor, the 1940 National Eugenics Law.²⁵ How could Matsunaga not know these facts?

I will return to Matsunaga following a flashback to the 1920s, when some Japanese scientists sought to show that eugenics, or the “science of improving human stock,” had been an inherent feature of Japanese everyday practices since at least the eighth century. Ikeda Shigenori (1892-1966), a German-trained eugenicist and founder of one of Japan’s several eugenics movements,²⁶ argued in a 1928 article that “those who may think that eugenics-based social betterment is utterly new could not be more mistaken. Even if the word “eugenics” is new, “eugenic truths” (*yūseigakuteki jijitsu*) were realized ages ago...for example, the Buddhism that was imported by Japan contained eugenic ideals that were practically implemented in the Nara period (eighth century).”²⁷ Ikeda, a fervent advocate of “eugenic marriages” (*yūsei kekkon*), was referring to ostensibly ancient Buddhist prescriptions for selecting a marriage partner — the partner should appear healthy, have no obvious deformities, no family history of insanity, criminal behavior, addictions, and so forth.²⁸

These are just two exemplary cases — there are many more, some of which follow — that illustrate how the history of eugenics has been both erased (by Matsunaga) and embellished (by Ikeda). Erasure and embellishment are two *apparently* different ways of reconciling past and present. “Apparently,” because, as I will argue, both modes of history-making are actually different facets of the same “modern myth” of renewal and recuperation. Such modes are by no means unique to Japan; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger popularized the expression “invention of tradition,” in drawing attention to the arbitrary and manipulated relationship between past and present in an array of international venues,²⁹ and Nicholas Thomas has charged the discipline of anthropology and the social sciences in general with confusing or even ignoring the relationship among temporality, history, and tradition.³⁰ It does seem to be the case, however, that erasure and embellishment are modes of history-making (and history-unmaking) tenaciously rehearsed and reenacted in Japan. As I will discuss, a politics of renewal poses significant and problematic conse-

quences for bioethics — which I described earlier as constituting a socio-political barometer.

Myths of renewal appear at various intervals in Japanese history. Perhaps the best known of these performances or actions of renewal are the *yonaoshi*, or “world renewal,” riots in the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), in which peasants sought to level the economic hierarchy of exploitation. However, the strategic theoretical articulation of renewal that is most relevant to my argument emerged with the Meiji Restoration of 1867, which marked the perception of a new beginning and the creation of “new Japan” (*shin’nippon*).³¹ A third moment of renewal was the creation of “postwar Japan,” a rubric that named another configuration of “new Japan” rather than marking a point in time. The prefix “new” in “new Japan” refers not to “first of its kind,” but rather to the contemporization of the “old” Japan.³² Former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s proclamation of the emergence of “post-postwar Japan” (Japanese) might be thought of as yet a fourth moment of renewal, albeit one that has not been as widely accepted as the still salient rubric, “postwar Japan.” Nakasone made his proclamation in the mid-1980s when the “bubble economy” was far from bursting. And not to be overlooked as a conscious act of historical renewal is the so-called “liberal historiography” of Tokyo University professor Fujioka Nobukatsu, who in the (post-bubble) mid-1990s organized a movement to “correct” history as a means of inculcating national(ist) pride.³³

The myth of renewal and recuperation that characterizes Japanese modernity is characterized by a persistent emphasis on “newness” itself. Thus, in the *Shintaisei yomibon*, or *Primer for the “New Order,”* published in 1940, “new” was equated with both the act and outcome of “rewriting history” (*rekishi o kakikaeru*). And one encounters in the official and popular literature of the early twentieth century, countless references to renewal: New Japan (*shin’nippon*), New Japanese (*shin’nipponjin*), New Order (*shintaisei*), New Science (*shinkagaku*), New Asia (*shin’ajia*), New East Asia (*shintōa*), and New Everyday Life (*shinseikatsu*), among the most ubiquitous rubrics.

Newness was also a defining characteristic of science, and for the most part the two terms, “new” and “science,” were used synonymously. Japanese science was imported from Europe at the instigation of the government, mostly in the period after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Rather than debates on the properties of science, pundits focused on building institutions and, by extension, on building a new era. The present Japanese term for science, *kagaku*, was coined in 1871, replacing the premodern term *kyūri* (“the investigation of the basic principle of things”).³⁴ *Kagaku* is defined in the encyclopedic *Kōjien* as a spectrum of specialized research topics and methods that produce “experiment-based systematic, rational knowledge of a part of the world (*sekai*).”³⁵

The ubiquity of the prefix “new” was matched by the prolific use of science (*kagaku*) as an adjective or prefix beginning in the 1910s and blatantly obvious by 1940. The titles alone of “new” or renamed popular magazines are illustrative: *Kagaku Sekai* (Science World), *Kagaku Gabō* (Science Illustrated), *Kodomo no Kagaku* (Science for Children), *Kagaku no Nippon* (Science Japan), *Shashin Kagaku* (Photography Science), *Kagaku Pen* (Science Pen, later

Kagaku Shichō or Science Trends), *Kagaku Chishiki* (Science Knowledge), *Kagakujin* (Scientist), *Kagaku Hyōron* (Science Commentary), and *Kagaku Bunka* (Science Culture), among others.

By the 1930s, when New Japan was a now familiar name for the nation-state, the popular and professional media alike were filled with articles debating the “*Japaneseness*” of science together with the specific properties of a “Japanese science” (*nipponteki kagaku*). Discovering and determining *Japaneseness* was a key component of new nation building; scientists, including eugenicists, were not alone in locating modern criteria of *Japaneseness* in the premodern past. The “new” Japan was a scientific nation-state, and pundits, in an ironic act of dehistoricization, projected the rubric “new” retrospectively in an effort to historicize modernity. The following excerpts from key eugenics journals are illustrative of this trend.

Two of the more blatant case studies of this tendency can be found in Ikeda’s journal, *Yūsei Undō* (Eugenic Exercise/Movement). A ten-part series titled “Marriage Practices in the Nara Period,” authored by historian Nakada Senpo, was published between December 1928 and January 1930. One installment (November 1929) included a section with the subheading “*dōsei wa metorazu*” to *yūsei kekkon* (“do not marry a person of the same surname” and eugenic marriages).³⁶ The proscription of marriage between individuals with the same surname refers to the discouragement of consanguineous unions, “extreme (*kanari bidoi*) examples of which,” Nakada asserts, “were evident in Japan.” The high rate of “blood marriages” in Japan was perhaps the number one concern of Japanese eugenicists.³⁷ Nakada goes on to argue that

although people in the Nara period probably did not have a modern scientific notion of eugenic knowledge, they nevertheless realized, based on their experiences, that blood marriages yielded negative consequences. They were also well aware of the dangers that physically deformed and feeble-minded offspring posed to the future of a family line. By the same token, when a particularly healthy child was born, they attributed that event to a superior marriage (i.e., superior parentage). These were not scientific findings, but rather these eugenic-like conclusions came from their cumulative experience. They practiced eugenics in all but name.³⁸

The second example is an anonymous article that appeared in February 1927, titled “Eugenic-like Facts Evident in the Kamakura Period.” The anonymous author cites the *Genpei seisuiki* (Chronicle of the rise and fall of the Minamoto and Taira), pointing out that the renowned woman warrior Tomoe Gozen is sought after for her “eugenic potential” by the powerful samurai Wada Yoshimori. That Wada’s “capture” of Tomoe as his mistress and the mother of their son, the herculean warrior Asahina Saburō, is probably a legend, is immaterial to the author, whose intention is to underscore the historical value in Japan of superior parentage. The author ends the essay by gushing,

it is so wonderful to realize that eugenic concerns were held by Japanese as early as the Kamakura period. Since the strength and valor of one’s offspring was the key to survival during those days, it is very likely that

eugenic-like views were widespread at that time. Both the father and the mother had to be strong. These were the “new Japanese” [*shinjin*, lit. “new people”] of the Kamakura period. It brings a smile to my face to know that marriage during that war-ridden period was premised on eugenic-like criteria.³⁹

A virtually identical article, probably the same one, was published in 1936 in *Yūseigaku* (Eugenics), a journal established in 1924 by medical journalist Gotō Ryūkichi. Gotō promoted eugenics as the foundation of Japanese nationalism. The only difference between the two articles was the addition of a concluding (and contemporizing) paragraph in the later version, which reads:

These [Kamakura-period] documents reveal the importance of inheriting only good seed [*tane*]. We must reflect on this. When analyzing the present situation, it is clear that the strength of the “family state” [*kazoku kokka*] is realized through the preservation of quality. Therefore, we must work incessantly to pass the eugenically beneficial sterilization law in order to raise the caliber of both the Japanese people and Japanese society.⁴⁰

These attempts to *historicize modernity*, as it were, represent a “modern myth” of renewal and recuperation, and were just as much acts of dehistoricization as were Matsunaga Ei’s denials of an early twentieth-century eugenics movement, noted earlier. Regarding Matsunaga, it is highly unlikely that he was unfamiliar with pre-1948 eugenics. After all, he was a college student during the 1940s, graduating at age twenty-three in 1945 from the Faculty of Medicine, Tokyo Imperial University, five years after the passage of the National Eugenics Law. In fact, quite a few Japanese scientists and professionals, including Ikeda Shigenori, removed from their postwar résumés references to their wartime activities and pro-eugenics activism.⁴¹ Nagai Hisomu, a physician who expounded on the benefits of “race hygiene” and who drafted the 1940 National Eugenics Law, effectively erased from his postwar résumé, his fervent and very public pro-sterilization lobbying during the 1930s and 1940s.⁴² Such deliberate acts of “self-dehistoricization” or “self-renewal” are also evident on the state level as well. The great reluctance of the state and its constituent agencies to fully acknowledge Japan’s militarist and imperialist activities in Asia from the late nineteenth century through 1945 is well known and is the subject of especially bitter debates in China and Korea. Japan occupied the position of “anti-colonial colonizer,” confounding the easy binary division of “the East” as colonized, “the West” as colonizer.⁴³

Both Matsunaga’s denials about the historical reality of eugenics in Japan and Ikeda’s recuperation of ancient Japanese practices under the modern rubric of eugenics are representative of a strategic mode of history-making that emerged in the late nineteenth century and remains very much in evidence today. It is a mode of history-making in which past events are continuously reinvoked, recuperated, and contemporized (or renewed) but *not historicized*; that is, past events are not researched and analyzed in terms of their actual historical character, conditions, and context.⁴⁴ In other words, both erasure and embellishment are actually *deliberate* acts of dehistoricization.

Historian John Dower provides a context for the salience in Japan of the twinned themes of renewal and dehistoricization. Since the Meiji Restoration, “the Japanese had not been socialized to preserve the status quo...they had been socialized to anticipate and accommodate themselves to drastic change.... Renovation and iconoclasm were strains as deeply imbedded in consciousness as were reverence for the past.”⁴⁵ With respect to Dower’s observations, the following events illustrate the application of the strategic deployment of renewal and dehistoricization. In July 1942, a conference celebrating atavism titled “Overcoming the Modern” (*kindai no chōkoku*) was convened by prominent scholars and social critics at the height of New Japan’s imperial expansion.⁴⁶ This conference was “mirror-imaged” less than four years later in the “new” postwar Japan by a roundtable discussion among pundits on “changing the world” (*yonaoshi zadankai*). Whereas the wartime conference invoked a time both before and beyond modern capitalist Japan, the 1946 roundtable alluded to the millenarian *yonaoshi*, or “world renewal,” movements of the Tokugawa period in charting a postwar future.⁴⁷ Both of these events were simultaneously acts of renewal and acts of “dehistoricization.”

Political theorist Maruyama Masao has argued that the “cult of the new or renewal” was a corollary of the spatialization of time evident in ultranationalist logic. This logic was explained by wartime ideologues as follows: “If we cut across the time axis, the events that occurred 2,600 years ago constitute the central layer....The happenings in Emperor Jimmu’s reign are therefore no[t] ancient tales but facts that exist at this very moment.”⁴⁸ In other words, the extension of the time axis simultaneously involves an enlargement of the spatial dimension, rendering past and present coeval.

Unlike Maruyama, I do not find that this logic of the time-space manifold was peculiar to ultranationalism. Rather, I suggest that the spatialization of time is part and parcel of a general modern and persistent Japanese historical epistemology of the coeval relationship of time and space. I interpret this coevality to represent an extreme form of uniformitarianism, whereby present and past processes are perceived as similar if not identical.⁴⁹ In a uniformitarian scheme, historical change or transformation is understood as continuity, and it proceeds not through punctuations and paradigm shifts, but through the steadily constant contemporization or renewal of the “same old” structures.

Japanese textbooks (published from the Meiji period to the present day) offer a good example of the spatialization of time and the epistemological consequences of such. Textbooks, along with many different types of books in general, including scientific books, almost always include a timeline or *nenpyō*. Timelines work both to expand and to compress time and space. The method of making a *nenpyō* involves the organization of selected events or snippets of historical data to establish through deliberate juxtaposition, the spatial contiguity and temporal continuity of those events and data. In the manner of montage, *nenpyō*, or timelines, thereby serve to create *new* genealogies and to provide *new* opportunities for uncovering, making and unmaking relationships and intersections of social reality.⁵⁰ The “magic” of *nenpyō* thus involves the creation of meaning, significance, and emotional impact by juxtaposing events and data

to create a context that is not intrinsic to any single event or datum but that is a product of *nenpyō*-making itself. I've coined this "magical" phenomenon "*nenpyō*logy," a "science" of genealogy-building that is fundamentally ahistorical and hyper-relativistic, and that also displaces, disrupts, and discourages historical analysis.⁵¹ Thus, to recapitulate my observations at the outset, whereas Matsunaga denied the existence of a eugenics movement in Japan, and constructed a timeline of birth control policy that began in 1948, Ikeda began his timeline in the eighth century in order to claim and naturalize a specifically *Japanese* eugenics.⁵²

Erasure, Embellishment, and Bioethics

I will conclude with a discussion of the (bio)ethical dilemma posed and produced by a historical epistemology premised on renewal and dehistoricization. This dilemma can be understood in part as a product of the hyper-relativism of *nenpyō*logy.

The abusive applications of eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century have provoked debates about the ethics of applied biotechnologies today. Recently, some scholars have proposed the existence of a so-called East Asian bioethics in contrast to a so-called Western bioethics. Spearheading these debates is retired philosophy professor Sakamoto Hyakudai, founder and past president of the East Asian Association for Bioethics. He explains that "East Asian bioethics" represents "an effort not only to deny the European ideal of individual autonomy, but also [to] harmonize it with the *new* holistic paternalism of our own East Asian traditional ethos" (*italics added*).⁵³

Sakamoto's rather paradoxical statement is strikingly close to the language of the *Cardinal Principles of the National Polity* (*Kokutai no hongī*), a manifesto of domestic ideology issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937.⁵⁴ This manifesto was at the core of the Japanese conception of Pan-Asian unity dating to the turn of the twentieth century.⁵⁵ As Dower explains,

In addition to the philosophizing and moralizing that undergirded it, the modern family-system ideology also involved mythologizing at two levels. Domestically, in the world of everyday affairs, it romanticized relationships in the actual kinship network, the work place, and the nation as a whole. In other words, the romanticized family metaphor helped to perpetuate the myth of harmony in a society where social tensions were severe and class conflict by no means absent. Refashioned for export, the same family metaphor was evoked to reinforce the myth of complementarity and reciprocity in what in actual practice was a grossly inequitable imperialistic power structure.⁵⁶

Whereas wartime ideologues debated whether or not an "East Asia cooperative body" (*tōa kyōdōtai*) constituted a geographical or regional entity or a "racial" entity,⁵⁷ Sakamoto is evasive and deploys "East Asia" as an ahistorical and self-evident thing. His unexplicated use of "new" and "traditional" recalls my point about the politics of renewal, and his use of "our" recalls the ethnocentric "Japanization-ism" (*nipponkashugi*) framing the inauguration in 1940 of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere and the "liberation" of Asia

from the yoke of European and American colonialism. On the one hand, New Japan was an imagined community constructed from select artifacts of Euro-American material cultures, a nation whose new Western inflections would, theoretically, allow it to withstand the encroachments of European and American powers. On the other hand, New Japan was both the legacy of and repository for the products of Asia's ancient cultural histories, and it assumed the task of salvaging Asia for the Asians. New Japan was thus distinguished by its cultural hybridity.

Sakamoto leaves as self-evident the orientalist notion of an internally coherent "East Asia" as well as the representativeness of "holistic paternalism," which he simply contrasts with the foil of an allegedly internally coherent, individualistic "West." Similarly, in an article on "global communitarianism or paternalism," Sakamoto invokes without elaboration the "Asian way of thinking" and "Asian ideas" in critiquing the concept of universal human rights,⁵⁸ and suggests that an "Asian way of thinking" would allow "even the idea of some new type of eugenics, such as 'negative eugenics' which tries only to protect human beings from becoming unhappier whatsoever 'unhappiness' would mean [*sic*]."⁵⁹ Ironically, despite his focus on "Asian thinking and ideas," Sakamoto's notes and references are limited to Anglophone and German philosophy texts; "Asian thinking" is not explored as a viable concept apart from cursory and ahistorical references to Taoistic naturalism, Confucian social benevolence, and the "Japanese tendency of self annihilating harmony."⁶⁰

It is now common knowledge among humanists and social scientists that "tradition" is not a synonym for "history," and that "traditions" can be invented, sometimes overnight, and are essentially presentist phenomena.⁶¹ Since Sakamoto's rhetoric and argument are both so similar to Japanese colonial ideology, and because Japan's imperialist aggression in Asia remains largely unacknowledged by the state and conveniently "forgotten" by many professionals, it is incumbent upon Sakamoto to elaborate on the theories and methods through which he determined the viability of the concept of "holistic paternalism" and, more generally, "East Asian bioethics." These are not self-evident, much less historically viable, realities.⁶² That Sakamoto founded the East Asian Association for Bioethics in 1995 is highly significant, for it was in the mid 1990s that the "re-asianization" of Japan, and its corollary, the "correct history movement," were in full swing. As Laura Hein and Ellen Hammond observe with perspicacity,

much of the discussion on Japan's "return" to Asia rhetorically posits Asia, including Japan, as an Eastern mode in stark opposition to a unified West. This dichotomy often supersedes any specific reference to intra-Asian relations, even when that is the ostensible subject....The eternal East versus West theorizing serves to obscure any sustained analysis of interactions between Japan and the other countries of Asia in the past or today....The theorists of reasianization...offer a carefully limited apology to Asians for Japanese wartime behavior by portraying Japan as having temporarily strayed from the true path of Asian familial intimacy...but then go on to reaffirm Japan's place at the top of a regional hierarchy naturalized with the cozy imagery of hearth and home....This move permits contrition but

conjures up images of well-meaning but overly authoritarian fathers rather than crimes against humanity.⁶³

Hein and Hammond point out that the greatest impact of the reasianization concept is on the shaping and reshaping of “Japanese ideas about themselves in the past as well as in the present.”⁶⁴ It seems quite clear that bioethics, informed as it is by reflexive questions about cultural, national, and global identity, is also patently susceptible to the forces of reasianization, which Sakamoto and others are broadcasting under the auspices of the East Asian Association for Bioethics. The applications and potential uses of biotechnologies are stretching the boundaries of existing medical and legal ethics and notions of human rights. A meaningful bioethics must be premised, with philosophical and analytical rigor, on more than easy foils like East versus West or unsubstantiated and ahistorical assertions of cultural difference. Moreover, Sakamoto’s formulation of “East Asian bioethics” strongly intimates that the allegedly Asian cultural ethic of “holistic paternalism” prevents “Western bioethics” from interfering with biotechnological progress in Japan.⁶⁵

Japan remains unmarked as a colonizer in Euro-American and (a majority of) Japanese, but not Asian, eyes. Postwar pundits have been just as adept in creating orientalist schema to “disappear” Japan’s imperialist past in rosy appeals to a transcendent (East) Asian culture that is uniquely different from “the West,” as Japanese wartime ideologues were in creating various orientalist schema to rationalize and aestheticize their imperialist claims in Asia and the Pacific. Japanese orientalism (or “reasianizationism”) essentializes and hyper-relativizes both Asia and “the West” in intensifying a dominant cultural or national image by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is strategically regarded as being both closer and far away from it.⁶⁶

There are numerous critics and critiques of a monolithic “West” or “Western” bioethics (Ahmad, Becker, Robertson, Ryan, among others),⁶⁷ but fewer scholars seem willing to exercise a similar skepticism toward the mythic, mystified, and hypostatized notion of a singular, “holistic,” “East Asian” bioethics. One who does is Tsuchiya Takashi, like Sakamoto a philosophy professor. Tsuchiya argues that any notion of an “East Asian” or “Japanese” bioethics must take into account the horrific wartime experiments conducted by Japanese scientists in the employ of the imperial state.⁶⁸ In short, Tsuchiya calls for the *historicization* and thus demystification of the concept of a “traditional” Japanese or East Asian bioethics. Although bioethicist Hamano Kenzo does not problematize the prefix “East Asian,” he nevertheless advocates a historical approach to bioethics — and particularly a closer look at Tokugawa Confucianism — in redressing the shortcomings of “medical paternalism.”⁶⁹ In the absence of historical analysis, much less an analysis of modes of history-making (and unmaking), it is far too easy (and even tempting) to venture expressions such as “East Asian bioethics,” premised, all too conveniently, on reified, dehistoricized, and ultimately untenable notions of “cultural difference” (East versus West, Japan versus “the rest”).

My primary objective in exploring the historical epistemology of renewal was threefold: first, to emphasize the importance of the incorporation of historical inquiry into bioethical debates; second, to resolve the apparent contradiction

of embellishment and erasure in Japanese science history; and third, to draw attention to the problematic concept and historical resonances of a singular “East Asian bioethics.” More specifically, I aimed to expose the unsettling history behind Sakamoto’s invocation of an “East Asian bioethics,” a history that he effectively “hides in the light” (by leaving self-evident) in order to justify the application of an “Asian way of thinking” in revising or “engineering” bioethics as a form of “global communitarianism.”⁷⁰ The question remains: Will East Asian bioethics be able to free itself from the sources that help generate the dilemmas it seeks to resolve?⁷¹ Dehistoricization gives rise to scientific and cultural *phantasms*; only through historicization can *actual* scientific practices, including eugenics, be accurately situated and critically analyzed, and in this way help to narrow the great divide between lived experiences and the discourses invoked either to interpret them or to forget them, or both.

Notes

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1. Van Potter, *Bioethics: The Bridge to the Future* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1971).
2. Albert Jonsen, “Introduction to the History of Bioethics,” in *Bioethics: An Introduction to the History, Methods and Practice*, ed. Nancy Jecker, Albert Jonsen, and Robert Perlman (Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1997), 9.
3. Maura Ryan, “Beyond a Western Bioethics?” *Theological Studies* 65, no. 1 (2004): 158-77.
4. Kajikawa Kin-Ichiro, “Japan: A New Field Emerges,” *The Hastings Center Report* 19, no. 4 (1989): 29-30.
5. Yonemoto Shōhei, *Baioeshikkusu* [Bioethics] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985).
6. URL: http://www.l.utokyo.ac.jp/shiseigaku/coe_eng_seika.html#journal.
7. Nukaga Yoshio, “Tracing the Birth of Bioethics in Japan,” *CGP NewsOnline* 2, no. 4 (2004); see also Akabayashi, Akira and Brian T. Slingsby, “Biomedical Ethics in Japan: The Second Stage,” *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 12 (2003): 261-64.
8. URL: <http://www.lifestudies.org>.
9. Although he does not identify himself as a Japan scholar, Darryl Macer has virtually monopolized to date the Anglophone literature on “Japanese bioethics,” almost all of which is published by the Eubios Ethics Institute he founded in 1990 at Tsukuba University.
10. Medical ethics were codified in 1951. There is now a huge literature on the brain death versus heart death debates in Japan. A comparative, comprehen-

sive, and compelling overview and analysis of the debates can be found in Margaret Lock, *Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). Curiously, there is no entry for “bioethics” in the index although references to “ethics” appear here and there in the book.

11. Renee C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, “Leaving the Field,” *The Hastings Center Report* 22, no. 5 (1992): 9; and “Medical Morality Is Not Bioethics: Medical Ethics in China and the United States,” *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 273 (1984): 336-60, at 360.
12. Although the word “bioethics” itself may be of recent vintage, I share with historian Tina Stevens the perspective that bioethics is actually the product of a much longer history. Stevens argues that in the United States, bioethics is the most recent product of “a centuries-long cultural legacy of American ambivalence toward progress” and that its modern roots lie in the “responsible science movement” occasioned by the development of nuclear weapons. See M.L.Tina Stevens, *Bioethics in America: Origins and Cultural Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
13. Ikeda Shigenori, “Hi no shita ni atarashiki mono nashi” (There’s nothing new under the sun), *Yūsei Undō* 3, no. 3 (1928): 18-27; Fujino Yutaka, *Nihon fuashizumu to yūsei shisō* (Japanese fascism and eugenic thought) (Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 1998), 83-86; Okada Sadako, “Atarashii oyakusho” (A new government office), *Kaizō* 6 (1933): 86-91.
14. Jennifer Robertson, “Japan’s First Cyborg? Miss Nippon, Eugenics, and Wartime Technologies of Beauty, Body, and Blood,” *Body and Society* 7, no. 1 (2001): 1-34; Jennifer Robertson, “Blood Talks: Eugenic Modernity and the Creation of New Japanese,” *History and Anthropology* 13, no. 3 (2002): 191-216.
15. Julian Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,” *Bioethics* 15, no. 5-6 (2001): 413-26.
16. Robertson, “Blood Talks.”
17. Robert Baker, “Bioethics and History,” no date given. On-line at <http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/faculty/pubs/baker.pdf>, pp. 2 and 7, of forty pages. Also published in the *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 27, no. 4 (2002): 447-74.
18. *Ibid.*, 31 (pdf).
19. *Ibid.*, 25-26.
20. *Ibid.*, 2.
21. See Martin S. Pernick, “On the Relationship Between Bioethics and History,” chap. 2, in *A History of Medical Ethics*, ed. Laurence McCullough and Robert Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
22. *Ibid.*, 2.
23. I discuss Sakamoto’s ideas later in this article. See also Hattori Keni, “East Asian Family and Biomedical Ethics,” in *Asian Bioethics in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Song Sang-yong, Koo Young-Mo, and Darryl R.J. Macer (Christchurch: Eubios Ethics Institute, 2003), 229-231; and Frank Leavitt, “The International Impact of Asian Bioethics,” in Song et al., *Asian Bioethics*, 224-28. Hattori is a physician based at Gunma University and Leavitt is on the faculty of Ben Gurion University.
24. Matsunaga Ei, “Birth Control Policy in Japan: A Review from Eugenic Standpoint [sic],” *Japanese Journal of Human Genetics* 13, no. 3 (1968): 189-200, at 199 and 189. Plus note 5: Throughout this article, Matsunaga uses the term “eugenics” without qualms or qualification. His non-Japanese peers would not be and have not been so forthright. “Eugenics” is a word freighted with horrific connotations as a result of abuses not only by the Nazis but by the governments of many other countries, including the United States, where involuntary steril-

ization had been carried out since 1906 on people deemed “unfit.” Of course, one could also say that whereas Matsunaga was forthright, some of his non-Japanese peers have been euphemistic, using in place of “eugenics” terms such as “procreative beneficence” (see Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence.”). A “clandestine second wave of eugenic practices” continues today in the guise of increasingly taken-for-granted biotechnologies. Genetic testing, gene-mapping, prenatal screening, selective (e.g., sex-specific) abortion, technologically assisted or enabled reproduction, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and surrogacy, are all “health” services and commodities offered in countries around the world, including Japan, under the authority of the state and legitimate medical institutions.

25. Briefly, the overarching purpose of the 1940 law was to insure the betterment of the Japanese ethnic nation (*minzoku*) by preventing the reproduction (through sterilization) of people with a hereditary disease, and by promoting the reproduction of genetically healthy people. “Unfit” was an ambiguous term that included sterility, mental illness, alcoholism, feeble-mindedness, physical deformities, disabilities, dementia, deaf-mutism, myopia and blindness, so-called deviant sexuality, and proneness to tuberculosis, syphilis, and criminal behavior. Obviously, not all of these conditions are inherited, and those that are may be hidden in “normal-looking” carriers. Finally, a key ideological component of the early Japanese eugenics movement was the reproduction of so-called pure-blooded (*junketsu*) Japanese, and, accordingly, Japanese eugenics in general was anti-miscegenationist. See Robertson, “Japan’s First Cyborg,” and Robertson, “Blood Talks.”
26. Born in January 1892 in Nikaho town (Yuri district, Akita prefecture), Ikeda Shigenori attended college in Tokyo. Following his graduation from Tokyo Foreign Language University (Tokyo Gaigodai), he was employed by Kōdansha, a prominent publishing house, to edit the magazine *Taikan* (Outlook). He later joined the *Hōchi Shinbun*, a major daily newspaper, and served as a special correspondent to Germany from 1919 to 1924, where he earned doctorates in eugenics and women’s history. He was transferred to Moscow in 1925 before returning to Japan and founding Yūsei Undō (Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association) and a eugenics journal (of the same name), both of which aimed to foster among the general public an interest in incorporating hygienic and eugenic practices into everyday life practices. The journal ceased publication in January 1930. Ikeda rekindled his journalism career the following year by assuming the editorship of the *Keijō Nippō* (Seoul Daily News), based in Seoul. He returned to the *Hōchi Shinbun* as an editor in 1938, and from 1941 through the end of the war worked for Naval Intelligence (Kaigun hōdōbu). After the war he became a prominent “social commentator” (*byōronka*), known for his entertaining essays on a wide array of topics, from the origins of both sushi and Japanese photography, to canine welfare in different cultures and the fate of Japanese *konketsuji* (“mixed-blood children”). Ikeda Shigenori, *Ikite yakutatsu banashi no mimibukuro* (An earful of stories useful for living) (Tokyo: Hokushindō, 1956); Ikeda Shigenori, *Ikite yakutatsu banashi no mimibukuro—Zoku* (An earful of stories useful for living—continuation) (Tokyo: Hokushindō, 1957). He passed away in 1966.
27. Ikeda, “Hi no shita ni atarashiki mono nashi,” 26.
28. See Robertson, “Blood Talks.”
29. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
30. Nicholas Thomas, *Out of Time: History and Evolution in Anthropological Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

31. Renewal was also conceptualized according to a sexual division of labor: males in short hair and suits were to represent the modern, forward-looking “new Japan,” while females in chignons and kimono were to represent “tradition” (itself a modern product) and, in this way, serve as a living benchmark for the new nation-state’s modernity and progress.
32. Note that “Japanese tradition” was invented in the Meiji period (1868-1912) to serve as a foil for establishing “newness” and modernity. See Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985) and Jennifer Robertson, “Empire of Nostalgia: Rethinking ‘Internationalization’ in Japan Today,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 14, no. 4 (1997): 97-122.
33. Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to ‘Correct’ History,” in *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 53-73; and Aaron Gerow, “Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neonationalistic Revisionism in Japan,” in Hein and Selden, eds., *Censoring History*, 74-95.
34. James Bartholomew, *The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 4.
35. “Kagaku” in *Kōjien*, ed., *Shinmura Izuru* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), 371.
36. Nakada Senpo, “Narachō jidai ni okeru kekkon (9)” (Marriage in the period of the Nara court), *Yūsei Undō* (Eugenic Exercise/Movement) 4, no. 11 (1929): 107-109. Note: “dōsei wa metorazu” was an admonition in the *Analects of Confucius*.
37. Robertson, “Blood Talks,” 198-202.
38. Nakada, “Narachō jidai ni okeru kekkon (9),” 108.
39. “Kamakura jidai ni arawaretaru yūseigakuteki jijitsu” (Eugenic truths evident in the Kamakura period), *Yūsei Undō* (Eugenic Exercise/Movement) 2, no. 2 (1927): 21.
40. “Kamakura jidai ni arawaretaru yūseigakuteki jijitsu” (Eugenic truths evident in the Kamakura period), *Yūseigaku* (Eugenics) 144 (1936): 21.
41. Watanabe Kazuo, “Ikeda Ringi (Shigenori),” in *Akita Daihyakka Jiten*, ed. Akita Kaishinpōsha (Akita: Akita Kaishinpōsha, 1981).
42. Sabine Frühstück, *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 213, n. 27.
43. Robertson, *Takarazuka*, and Robertson, “Blood Talks.”
44. I am referring here to a theoretical approach to history known as “cognitive realism,” or a tacit assumption that there exists an actual historical reality beyond our senses about which we can obtain increased knowledge through assiduous research. Cognitive realism is not to be confused with “naïve realism,” which assumes a past reality that is directly reflected in already available sources and narratives. See Mats Lindqvist, “Between Realism and Relativism: A Consideration of History in Modern Ethnology,” *Ethnologia Scandinavica* 22 (1992): 3-16, at 6.
45. John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 178-79.
46. Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 34-94.
47. John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1999), 179, 584, n18.
48. Emperor Jimmu was the first mythological emperor of Japan (660-585 BCE) and mythological founder of the present imperial family. The *Mission of Divine Japan and the Resolve of the Japanese People*, 1943, cited in Maruyama Masao,

- Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 21.
49. Obviously, evoking the coequality of past and present is not a practice monopolized by the Japanese alone; as one reviewer quite aptly pointed out, religious doctrines in particular exploit this “logic.” My use of “uniformitarianism” is adopted from the geological concept of the same name, which states that existing processes acting in the same manner as at present are sufficient to account for all geological changes.
 50. In his essay, “The Principles of Montage,” Russian filmmaker Lev Vladimirovich Kuleshov, who was one of the first to develop a theory of montage, argues that “[t]he interaction of separate montage segments, their position, and likewise their rhythmic duration, become the contents of the production and the world view of the artist. The very same action, the very same event, set in different places with different comparisons, ‘works’ differently ideologically.” See Lev Kuleshov, *Kuleshov on Film* Ronald Levaco, trans. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 194. See also Robertson, *Takarazuka*, chap. 3, for a discussion of montage as historical epistemology.
 51. In this connection I was intrigued to find that the “history” page of the website for the National Genetics Institute of Japan is a timeline that begins with the establishment of the Institute in April 1949.
 52. Jennifer Robertson, “Eugenical Phantasms: Embellishments and Erasures in Japanese Science History,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, New York, 28 March 2003, on the panel organized by Jennifer Robertson, “Tropics of History: Genealogical Forces and Fictions in East Asia.” See also Yamaguchi Tomomi, “Feminism as Chronology: The Place of Timelines (*nenpyō*) in Women’s History,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, New York, 28 March 2003, on the panel organized by Jennifer Robertson, “Tropics of History: Genealogical Forces and Fictions in East Asia.”
 53. Sakamoto Hyakudai, “New Initiatives in East Asian Bioethics.” *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* 5, no. 2 (1995): 30; and Sakamoto Hyakudai, “Foundations of East Asian Bioethics,” *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* 6 (1996): 31-32.
 54. This tract was supplemented by two later Education Ministry publications, “The Way of the Subject” (Shinmin no michi, 1941) and the “Cardinal Guiding Principles of Wartime Family Education” (Senji katei kyōiku shidō yōkō, 1942). See Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 280.
 55. Joyce Lebra, ed., *Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).
 56. Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 281.
 57. Shinmei Masamichi, “East Asia Cooperative Body,” in Lebra, ed., *Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, 14-19.
 58. Sakamoto Hyakudai, “Genome, Artificial Evolution, and Global Communitarianism,” *The Annals of the Japan Association for the Philosophy of Science* 10, no. 4 (2002): 35, 45.
 59. *Ibid.*, 45.
 60. *Ibid.*
 61. For examples of invented traditions in Japan see Stephen Vlastos, ed., *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998).
 62. As Leonardo de Castro remarks in a 1999 article in *Bioethics* in which he gently rebuts Sakamoto’s notion of “East Asian bioethics,” we must accept that there is no Asian bioethics that would cover the entire range of Asian countries...we

- must guard against the homogenizing tendencies of bioethical discourse declaring faith in an Asian identity." (Leonardo de Castro, "Is There an Asian Bioethics?" *Bioethics* 13, no. 3/4 (1999): 232. At the fifth Asian Bioethics Conference annual meeting (14-15 February 2004, Tsukuba University, Japan), I invited Professor Sakamoto to clarify his concept of "holistic paternalism" in conjunction with "East Asian bioethics" but he refused to respond.
63. Laura Hein and Ellen H. Hammond, "Homing in on Asia: Identity in Contemporary Japan," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 27, no. 3 (1995): 3, 5.
 64. *Ibid.*, 5.
 65. Similarly, historian M.L.Tina Stevens delineates the role of bioethics in protecting corporate interests in the United States. See Stevens, *Bioethics in America*.
 66. Robertson, *Takarazuka*, 99; see also Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979 [1978]), 55.
 67. See, among others, Aijaz Ahmad, "Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the 'National Allegory,'" *Social Text* 15 (1986): 65-88; Gerhold Becker, "Asian and Western Ethics: Some Remarks on a Productive Tension," *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* 5 (1995): 31-33; Robertson, *Takarazuka*; and Ryan, "Beyond a Western Bioethics?")
 68. Tsuchiya Takashi, "Why Japanese Doctors Performed Human Experiments in China, 1933-1945," *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics* 10 (2000): 179-180.
 69. Hamano Kenzo, "Human Rights and Japanese Bioethics," *Bioethics* 11, no. 3 (1997): 328-35.
 70. Sakamoto, "Genome," 44.
 71. Stevens, *Bioethics in America*, 158.

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