

Furusato Japan: The Culture and Politics of Nostalgia

Author(s): Jennifer Robertson

Source: *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Summer, 1988, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer, 1988), pp. 494-518

Published by: Springer

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20006871>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*

Furusato Japan: The Culture and Politics of Nostalgia

Jennifer Robertson

Introduction

*"Future society is the flavor of furusato."*¹

Furusato literally means "old village," but its closer English equivalents are "home" and "native place." As a landscape, the quintessential features of *furusato* include forested mountains, fields cut by a meandering river, and a cluster of thatch-roof farmhouses. *Furusato* also connotes a desirable lifestyle aesthetic summed up by the term *soboku*, or artlessness and rustic simplicity. Today, *furusato* is one of the most popular symbols used by Japanese politicians, city planners, and advertisers.

What has inspired the widespread, compelling appeal of *furusato* in Japan today? This article constitutes a preliminary exploration of the culture and politics of *furusato* in postwar Japan.

Furusato is a word, or signifier, whose very ubiquity may camouflage its importance for understanding and interpreting Japanese culture. By ubiquity I do not mean trivial or inane, but rather familiar: in other words, the ubiquity of *furusato* derives from the manifold contexts in which it may be appropriated, from the gustatorial to the political economic. My general thesis is that the ubiquity of *furusato* as a signifier of a wide range of cultural productions effectively imbues these productions with unifying—and ultimately nativist and national—political meaning and value.

Furusato can only be fully comprehended by observing both how the term is used ordinarily and how it has been appropriated by various members of, and interest groups in, Japanese society. The evocation of *furusato* is an increasingly cogent means of simultaneously fostering we-feelings and insideness at local and national levels. *Furusato* Tokyo, for example, is enveloped by *Furusato* Japan. The process by which *furusato* is evoked into existence is called *furusato-zukuri*, or home/native-place making. Ultimately, *furusato-zukuri* is a political process by which culture, as a collectively constructed and shared system of symbols, customs and beliefs, is socially reproduced.

My investigation of *furusato-zukuri* in postwar Japan suggests that it is motivated by a nostalgia for nostalgia, a state of being provoked by a dissatisfaction with the present on the grounds of a remembered, or imagined, past plenitude. Since nostalgia is a barometer of present moods, I will discuss the exigencies occasioning postwar *furusato-zukuri* and *furusato* ideology.²

In this article, I present an analysis of *furusato* ideology as it is manifested in a wide variety of sources, from city planning treatises and political platforms, to letters to the editor, advertisements, and popular songs, all dealing in some capacity with *furusato*. My discussion for the most part is limited to the 1970's onward, when, for reasons to be examined, *furusato* emerged as a cogent and compelling signifier for, and symbol of, things Japanese.

I begin with a discussion of the temporal and spatial dimensions of *furusato*, followed by a review of its popular definitions, among them those included in the new Liberal Democratic Party platform. An analysis of the "landscape of nostalgia" is followed by a review of the recent creation of "*furusato* villages" and a concluding section on the making of *Furusato* Japan.

The Time and Space of Furusato

Furusato comprises both a temporal and spatial dimension. The temporal dimension is represented by the word *furu(i)*, which signifies pastness, historicity, senescence and quaintness. Furthermore, *furu(i)* signifies the patina of familiarity and naturalness that objects and human relationships acquire with age, use, and interaction. The spatial dimension is represented by the word *sato*, which suggests a number of places inhabited by humans. These include a natal household, a hamlet or village, and the countryside (as opposed to the city). *Sato* also refers to a self-governed, autonomous area, and, by extension, to local autonomy.

The written form of *furusato* also manifests its multivalent nature. 故郷 is the ideograph most commonly used today, but *furusato* frequently is rendered in *hiragana*, the cursive syllabary, as ふるさと.³ The characters provide ideographic cues structuring the visual (mind's eye) apprehension of *furusato*; namely, an "old village." The syllables, *fu-ru-sa-to*, however, provide no such extra-textual referents but rather re-present the sound *furusato* itself as a thing. That *furusato* today most frequently is written in the cursive syllabary is because the word is being used in an affective capacity to signify not a particular place—such as a real "old village," for

example—but rather the generalized nature of such a place and the warm, nostalgic feelings aroused by its mention.

Moreover, even when the ideographs are used, the current practice is to superimpose syllables above or alongside them to insure that the compound is voiced “*furusato*” instead of its alternative Chinese-style reading, “*kokyō*.”⁴ The ideograph thereby is divorced from its extra-textual referents and transformed from a denotative sign to a connotative sign signifying the affective texture of *furusato*, or “old village”-ness.⁵ Moreover, as a *yamatokotoba*, or “really real” Japanese word, *furusato* (unlike *kokyō*) appears natural, familiar, and culturally relative. *Yamatokotoba* denotes, with more than a hint of ethnocentricity—particularly when rendered in the indigenous *hiragana*—a native Japanese word as opposed to a Chinese loanword. *Furusato* thus imbues whatever it names or is prefixed to with traditionalness and cultural authenticity. In its connotative capacity, *furusato* is endlessly commutable, as is clear from the variety of evocations of *furusato* presented in this article.

The Japanese media are rife with references to *furusato*: the “flavor of *furusato*” (*furusato no aji*), the “forests of *furusato*” (*furusato no mori*), the “commonsensical wisdom of *furusato*” (*furusato no chie*), and the sobriquet, *Furusato* Japan, to cite but a few. The mass media contribute to and exploit the ubiquity of *furusato*, and help to make consensual its popular imagination. The landscape depicted in, for instance, illustrated Tamajiman-brand *sake* advertisements consists of the quintessential features of *furusato* described earlier. An ode to *furusato* serves as a caption: “The scenery of the Tama range carries to you a warm smell and the nostalgic song of *furusato*. This evening, bring on a rush of memories with a cup of our *sake*.” Such advertisements help endow rural topography with hallowed content, effectively furthering its sentimental appeal. The appropriation of *furusato* by *sake* advertisers is particularly apt since *sake* is an indigenous alcoholic beverage made from rice, a crop redolent of nativist symbolism. One ancient nickname for Japan, in fact, is *mizuho no kuni* (land of fresh rice ears).

Enka, a type of ballad, similarly eulogizes the landscape of nostalgia. These popular songs, enthusiastically crooned at home and in bars by millions of Japanese *karaoke* (sing-along tape) aficionados, provoke tear-jerking memories of *furusato*. Lyricists resort most frequently to three categories of *furusato* symbols in order to facilitate this response. They are symbols of a rural landscape: dirt path, sky, fields, mountains; symbols of estrangement: train, train station, port, train whistle, soldier, letter; and

symbols of an “old village” lifestyle: spinning wheel, lullaby, paper lantern, shrine festival.⁶ *Enka*, furthermore, are sung in a nostalgic modality, which involves such conventions as a minor key, slow tempo, wavering melody, and repetitious cadences.⁷

The cogency of *furusato*, as a sentimentally evoked topography, increases in proportion to the sense of homelessness experienced by Japanese individuals or groups. In this regard, Japanese social scientists⁸ have suggested that with the rapid urbanization of the countryside since the postwar period, the Japanese “can’t go home again.” Because villages and cities have lost their distinctiveness as social environments due to the urbanization of the former, the nostalgia provoked by estrangement from an “old village” has become thin and insignificant (*kihaku*).⁹ There is no particular place to “go home” to; consequently, there is no particular place to feel nostalgic toward. Homelessness today is a postmodern condition of existential disaffection: nostalgia for the experience of nostalgia. A diffuse sense of homelessness then, can be seen as an important socio-psychological motive for the *furusato-zukuri* project and the symbolic reclamation of the landscape of nostalgia.

The literary critic, Kobayashi Hideo (1902–82), presaged the postwar experience of homelessness in an essay titled, “*Kokyo o ushinatta bungaku*” (Homeless literature, 1933). Kobayashi’s realization of the mnemonic construction of *furusato* was attributed, paradoxically, to his own inability to conceptualize “old village” life, a condition he blamed on the fact that he was born and raised in Tokyo.¹⁰ He was estranged not from a rural hometown, but from the *melancholy experience of estrangement* from a rural hometown.

Today at train stations along the Yamanote Line, which encircles the heart of Tokyo, new *Furusato* Tokyo signs have been posted to direct people to shrines, temples, and historical landmarks in the vicinity. The *Furusato* Tokyo emblem consists of a red orb, symbol of the Japanese nation-state, across which is superimposed a blue rectangle inscribed in white with “*Furusato* Tokyo” (ふるさと東京). Every year since 1981, The Tokyo Metropolitan Life-Culture Bureau has sponsored the *Furusato* Tokyo Festival. Posters for the October 1984 event featured the slogan, *Kokoro no naka no Tokyo e satogaeri suru hi* (The day to go home to the Tokyo in [your] heart-mind) reflecting the mnemonic construction of *furusato*. Unlike the *bon* (ancestor’s) festival in late summer and the New Year’s festival, two occasions when vast numbers of Tokyo residents return to their natal households, the October event is an occasion for psychic mobility. Residents are encouraged to make a metaphysical return to their new hometown, *Furusato* Tokyo.¹¹

The Past in the Present

While the imagination of *furusato* is not constrained by the necessity of a physically present rural landscape, the possibility of its current realization is shaped by a history of discourse about the Japanese countryside. There exists a literary genre of affective environmentalism, beginning in the eighth century with the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, including poetry anthologies and Edo-period (1603–1868) farm manuals, and persisting today in the form of domestic policy platforms, city charters, and *sake* advertisements among others.

The confluence of affect and environment is especially evident in the newly revitalized work of Shiga Shigetaka (1863–1927), who identified the mountains, forests, valleys, and streams, as the “original forces that nurture the Japanese sense of aesthetics, have nurtured it in the past, and will nurture it in the future.”¹² *Furusato-zukuri*, in this context, may be interpreted as a means of insuring the durability of native/national aesthetics in the face of pervasive urbanization and environmental pollution. Shiga, moreover, in his recently republished magnum opus, *Nihon fūkeiron* (Treatise on the Japanese landscape, 1894), declared that nature is more beautiful in Japan than anywhere else and even insisted that foreign visitors to Japan were awestruck and humbled by the unparalleled beauty of the archipelago. Written during the westernizing Meiji period (1868–1912), Shiga’s widely read treatise was an important factor in the development of a national identity predicated on both an “[a]ffection for the Japanese countryside and pride in its distinctive beauty,”¹³ as well as an awareness of Japan’s dramatic emergence in international affairs.

That *furusato-zukuri* recalls in spirit if not in substance early twentieth-century efforts to achieve cultural and national identity in a modernizing context, may partially be due to the fact that, as historian Carol Gluck argues, “Japan’s modern myths were made in and from the Meiji period.”¹⁴ There are, however, crucial differences between *furusato-zukuri* today and Meiji-period mythopoeia. Most important is the absence in the *furusato-zukuri* project of an appeal to the preservation of an agrarian economy. Full-time farmers presently constitute less than eight *per cent* of the working population, as opposed to an average of 60% during the Meiji period, and agricultural production today accounts for less than four *per cent* of the GNP.

The general design of *furusato-zukuri* projects throughout Japan, as I discuss shortly, deals not with an agrarian economy in crisis, but with the recreation of a village-like ambience in cities and

villages alike. Furthermore, the incommensurability between city and country perceived by the Meiji ideologues is resolved in the *furusato-zukuri* project as a dialectic of modernity and tradition, as sobriquets such as “*Furusato Tokyo*” reveal quite literally. Finally, the catalyst for *furusato-zukuri* is a nostalgia for nostalgia. This contrasts with the political ideology of the emperor system during the Meiji period, an ideology whose wider applications in the attempt to achieve and maintain national unity and identity included the effort to secure an agrarian system of production and social relations.¹⁵ For this last reason especially, *furusato* should not be regarded as a homologue of the Meiji construct, *kokutai*, the organic national polity.

Furusato does, however, appear to be a projection of what the ethnologist Origuchi Shinobu (1887–1953) referred to as the “eternal-land cult” of Yamato, the ancient name for Japan from which *yamatokotoba* derives. Origuchi suggested, after the lexicographer Otsuki Fumihiko (1847–1929), that Yamato gradually evolved from signifying a “gateway where one enters the mountains” to the land entered through that gateway.¹⁶

The fact is that the people of old regarded the area within the mountain gateway as being sunny and cheerful. . . . When one descended through the gateway, one came upon a fertile plain, a bright and happy land. It was generally thought that once inside the gateway, one encountered no more barriers. Consequently, attention was focused on the gateway itself, and its name, *yamato*, came to be applied to the land of light and hope within.¹⁷

The generic mountainous landscape now associated with *furusato* appears to be at once a gateway *and* the land inside. Current popular definitions of *furusato* provide a gateway to further understanding of the Japanese landscape of nostalgia.

Popular Definitions

At the beginning of 1984, the *Asahi Shinbun* (one of the three leading national dailies) solicited essays for a column on the subject of “new *furusato*.” (The very appearance of such a column attests the significance and newsworthiness of *furusato*.) “New” signifies that because *furusato* as remembered or imagined by most Japanese either does not exist or is no longer extant, it must be (re)constructed anew. Below are brief synopses of four essays selected for publication in the morning edition of January 14, 1984. Collectively, they indicate the potential of *furusato* as a basis for the codification

of public opinion within the larger political context of *urusato-zukuri*.

First is an account written by a middle-aged woman, a homemaker. She distinguishes between the household's *urusato*, which she identifies as her husband's natal household, and her own *urusato*. The latter, she explains, is each of the places she has ever lived. Her *sarariman* ("salary man") husband was transferred several times and so the family has resided in several cities. Her criterion for a "new *urusato*" is affective in nature: "When and if a kernel of confidence, trust, and dependency grows between you and your new neighbors, then a new *urusato* is born." For this woman, affect *per se* is more central to the re-creation of *urusato* than the evocation of a rural landscape, although historically, the symbols of affective community are associated with the countryside.¹⁸

An unemployed 79-year-old man, on the other hand, insists that two minimum necessary conditions must be met if a place is either to maintain or achieve *urusato* status. They are "motherly love" and a "local dialect." "Without these conditions," he writes, "the *urusato*-feeling toward a place will evaporate, and regardless of whether it is a residence inherited from one's ancestors, it will float free, remembered only as a far away place." This essayist recognizes the capacity of language for "generating imagined communities" and building "particular solidarities."¹⁹ His identification of "motherly love" with *urusato* is also of considerable importance in understanding the symbolic-affective valences of *urusato* in postwar Japanese society.

The popular association of "mother" and *urusato* is so tenacious that social critic Matsumoto Ken'ichi insists that two words are synonymous. Because of the rampant urbanization during the postwar period wrought by rapid economic growth, *urusato* no longer exists as a "concrete entity" (*jittai*). Likewise, with the concomitant predominance of urban nuclear families, "mother" no longer symbolizes the countryside, the farm village, or agricultural productivity. Matsumoto concludes that having lost their external referents, both *urusato* and mother are "dead words" (*shigo*).²⁰

Matsumoto argues that both *urusato* and mother have been lost to the same intrusive forces: westernization, industrialization, and urbanization. This point is more fully understood in light of *amae*, psychiatrist Doi Takeo's term to describe a dyadic relationship of mutual dependency modeled after the mother-child manifold, in which one presumes upon another's willing benevolence: the "child" demands to be indulged, the "mother" encourages indulgence.²¹ Insofar as natal household is among its various definitions,

furusato, by extension, is a place where one can *amae* without compunction. *Furusato*, as a place redolent of “motherly love,” cannot exist without “mother.”

In Japan, mothers overwhelmingly are perceived as the irreplaceable primary agents of their children’s enculturation. But today, over 50% of mothers work for wages outside of their homes, a trend that disturbs many proponents of *furusato-zukuri*, for the

woman with an identity outside the family would not be compelled to find her self-worth only through the successes of her children; accordingly, a strong psychological impetus to induce *amae* in them would be lost.²²

The *furusato-zukuri* project calls for the realignment of women and the gender role of “good wife, wise mother.” By the same token, home-based mothers are encouraged to collect local folktales and read them to their children, ostensibly raising the place consciousness of both parties.²³ Exponents of native-place making are thus keen on reviving and maintaining the synonymy of “mother” and *furusato* in the face of urbanization.

A third contributor to the column on “new *furusato*,” a homemaker, identifies progress as the juggernaut that has crushed the elan of *furusato*. Her account is a personal one. She is discouraged by, but somewhat resigned to, the consequences of urbanization, to which *furusato* is all too vulnerable. The image she evokes is one of rice paddies overlaid with concrete highways. She recognizes, however, that people (in this case farmers) themselves ultimately are to blame, for their desire to profit from land sales only hastens urbanization (regardless of their concrete socio-economic motives for giving up the hoe).

A final essay was submitted by a middle-aged man, a civil servant. He wonders whether the so-called “my town” planned communities presently under development throughout Japan can ever be realized as “new *furusato*.” Placing *furusato* within a rural setting, he argues that “campestral features such as nostalgia, pleasant scenery, compassion, and camaraderie cannot simply be reassembled and called *furusato*.” His conditions for an “authentic new *furusato*” are presented as desirables and imperatives. He insists that

furusato should be a place where one can return whenever the urge strikes. And, ideally, it is a place where one’s *kokoro* [heart-mind, conscience] finds repose and where daily-life routines are grounded in compassion. Second, it should be a place where customs and traditions are highly valued. The history of a town or village should be transmitted through story from generation to generation, and this

in turn should be the source nurturing familistic ties and a feeling of regional solidarity. Third, an authentic *furusato* is not likely to be realized on the basis of an academic blueprint implemented by government offices. Residents themselves must determine self-consciously just what is *furusato*.

Ironically, and perhaps because he is a civil servant, this essayist's criteria of and for a "new *furusato*" are virtually identical to those recommended by central and local government, as well as civilian, proponents of *furusato-zukuri* programs. Also evident here is the notion of the rural village as a repository of affective social values, and an appeal to self-government or local autonomy (*jichi*).

Furusato-zukuri programs are often categorized under the epochal rubric, *chihô no jidai*, or "age of localism." Since the late 1970s when the expression was coined, a vociferous debate has waged on as to whether "age of localism" is used euphemistically to disguise the collapse of local autonomy, or whether it marks a departure from and a viable alternative to Tokyo-centrism.²⁴ For instance, Isomura Eiichi, Chair of the Japan Urban Studies Association, contends that *chihô no jidai* actually names an "age of cities." That is, the slogan reflects a move on the part of regional cities to emerge from the shadow cast by Tokyo and assert their "unique" characteristics.²⁵ While this article is not the place for an extended discussion on the vicissitudes of local autonomy in Japan,²⁶ it is pertinent to note that in the Meiji period as in the present examples, *chihô* was variously defined as the "opposite of cities" and/or any place outside Tokyo. Moreover, like *furusato-zukuri* today, *jichi* in the early twentieth-century possessed a double meaning: it emphasized localities' administrative self-governance and at the same time "tied the *chihô* as closely as possible to the center."²⁷

All but one of the above essayists equate *furusato* with a non-urban setting, and key *furusato* components—identified as nostalgia, pleasant scenery, local dialect, compassion, camaraderie, motherly love, enriching lifestyle—are described as qualities endemic to the countryside. The remaining essayist does suggest that *furusato* and city are compatible, insofar as neighborly trust and dependency are the foundation for a "new *furusato*." All four essayists are alike, however, in suggesting, explicitly and implicitly, that "new *furusato*" evokes the affective relationships and sociabilities presumed to have mediated and moderated life in "old villages."

Another perspective on the subject of "new *furusato*" is provided by a survey conducted in October 1985 by the newly established (May 1985) *Furusato Jôhô Sentô* (*Furusato* Information Center) in Tokyo. The Center was founded under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to facilitate the rehabilitation

of depopulated rural communities through the creation of city-country networks. Its operating budget for 1985 was about \$3 million (\$1=¥ 250), part of which was spent networking with over 1,700 cities, towns and villages; sponsoring symposia; installing a *furusato* information “hot line”; distributing pamphlets, newsletters, and guidebooks; and conducting a survey on *furusato*, its image and efficacy.²⁸

Part of the Center’s survey required the 1,920 female and male respondents to offer words, or signifiers, they associated with *furusato*. *Inaka* (countryside) overwhelmingly was the respondents’ first choice, followed by *shizen* (nature), *yama* (mountains), and *kawa* (rivers). Clearly, popular opinion equates *furusato* with the generic rural landscape I described at the outset of this article. Other popular concrete and affective associations included *ataakai* (warm, intimate), *shushinchi* (birthplace), *ryōshin* (parents), *haha* (mother), *soboku* (naive, pristine, simple) and *kokoro ga yasumaru tokoro* (place where the heart-mind can find solace), in that order.²⁹

The language of the essayists and the Center’s survey, strongly suggest that *furusato* is signified through *antithesis*. *Furusato* is not limited to an actual rural place, nor does it presuppose an agricultural lifestyle. It is, rather, everything that suburbs and metropolises are *not*: compassion, camaraderie, tradition, and even motherly love are presumed absent from postwar urbanized society, with its preponderance of nuclear families and mothers working for wages outside their homes. For the 43 *per cent* of all Japanese who live within 50 kilometers of the three largest cities (Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo) on one percent of the land—over 75 *per cent* live in urbanized areas—the image of an “old village” offers an appealing alternative to overcrowded, impersonal living conditions. Moreover, unlike the historical farm village, with its harsh system of sanctions (such as *Murahachibu* or ostracism), “new *furusato*” are benevolent communities emerging from the nostalgic imagination of “homeless” Japanese.

The grand design of the “new *furusato*” programs in suburban cities throughout Japan is the re-creation of a village-like ambience.³⁰ Recognizing that native-place making foremostly is a matter of reclaiming mental and cultural terrain, proponents of *furusato-zukuri* aim to cultivate and harvest that terrain, namely, the landscape of nostalgia.

The Landscape of Nostalgia

In his treatise, *Bungaku ni okeru genfūkei* (Original landscapes in literature), Okuno Takeo offers a nativist explanation as to why

“old village” is such a ready model of and for cultural renewal. The Japanese, he claims, “traditionally a farming people,” and despite a century of industrialization and urban growth, “are subconsciously, collectively imprinted with the image of farm (paddy) villages and their environs.”³¹ Since *furusato* is, according to Okuno, an ur-landscape permanently etched on the *kokoro* of ethnic Japanese, it can be evoked through the agency of nostalgia. Okuno’s ideas effectively illustrate the cultural ideology and mythopoeia at the basis of *furusato-zukuri*.

Nostalgia figures as a distinctive way of relating the past to the present and future. It does this by juxtaposing the “uncertainties and anxieties of the present with presumed verities and comforts of the . . . past.”³² Nostalgia is not a product of the past, for what occasions it resides in the present, regardless of the sustenance provided by memories of the past.

To refer to the past, to take account of or interpret it, implies that one is located in the present, that one is distanced or apart from the object reconstructed. In sum, the relationship of prior to present representations is symbolically mediated, not naturally given; it encompasses both continuity and discontinuity.³³

Nostalgia is provoked by a dissatisfaction with the present on the grounds of a remembered, or imaged, past plenitude. By the same token, the nostalgic reaction generally is of a distinctly conservative bent, although nostalgia may also fuel a fervor for cultural transformation. As a socio-political metaphor, “revolutionary” may name a philosophy or movement concerned with returning to the Good Old Days, or to a pristine “traditional” form of society.³⁴ The nostalgia for nostalgia motivating *furusato-zukuri* is a “new” paradigm within which to orient and value cultural productions. The proponents of native-place making acknowledge the newness of the old, as evinced by the oxymoronic term, “new *furusato*.”³⁵

Furusato Japan constitutes a synthesis of nativism and nationalism. In the case of nativism, nostalgia embodies a profound rejection of externally imposed identities.³⁶ With respect to nationalism, nostalgia is or influences the style in which nationness is imagined.³⁷ The prefix *furusato* is used to identify and distinguish things indigenous to Japan and the Japanese. But the sobriquet also attests to the central government’s recent appropriation of *furusato* as an administrative model of and for a “new” national culture.

Furusato-zukuri was adopted in 1984 by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the affective cornerstone of domestic cultural policy. The new policy, referred to as *Nippon rettô furusato*

ron (Proposal for *Furusato* Japan), was introduced by then Finance Minister, Takeshita Noboru, in a televised speech. Since then, Takeshita, now Prime Minister, has appropriated *furusato* as his own political platform. Political factionalism aside, however, the LDP as a whole regards *furusato-zukuri* as the means by which to forge a new “cultural polity” (*bunka kokka*) and a “new Japanese-style welfare state” (*Nihonsei no atarashii fukushi kokka*).³⁸

Tanaka Kakuei, the former (and now incapacitated) Prime Minister, spearheaded LDP interest in *furusato-zukuri* with his 1973 bestseller, *Nippon retto kaizō ron* (Proposal for remodeling Japan). Takeshita simply replaced “remodeling” with *furusato* in appropriating his former mentor’s title.) In his book, Tanaka bemoaned the fact that “for an increasing number of people, *furusato* is but a small apartment in the city,” and worried that “the present state of affairs will make it difficult for the Japanese people to transmit their superior qualities and wisdom to the next generation.” His proposed program of decentralizing industries and increasing transportation networks was aimed at creating “what the Japanese people want most . . . a beautiful, liveable land and an untroubled future.”³⁹ Tanaka’s proposal fizzled when it was disclosed that his associates had been informed of details which gave them an opportunity to speculate in local real estate, and was rendered economically moribund by the “oil shocks” of the early seventies.

Where Tanaka had focused on remodeling the physical landscape, it appears that Takeshita and the LDP are interested in exploiting the affective potential of *furusato-zukuri* toward the creation of a politically symbolic landscape of nostalgia. *Furusato* Japan symbolizes the reorientation of domestic policy from a preoccupation with material needs, to a preoccupation with the affective dimensions of national and civic life. Its folkish, nostalgic connotations imbue the *furusato-zukuri* project with an emotional appeal and a legitimacy sanctioned by “tradition.” But as I discuss later in the context of advertising, the “tradition” evoked by *furusato* does not depend upon an objective relation to either the past or the countryside.⁴⁰

As something broadly Japanese, *furusato* appeals to a wide spectrum of political interests, from the right to the left. The postwar re-valuation of indigenous traditions was promoted from the early 1950s by localists and “anti-government” forces, and *furusato* is also appropriated today by the conservative LDP. Actually, the LDP appropriated *furusato* only after its rhetorical and symbolic usefulness had been established by local and regional agents, both private and governmental. The promotion of native-place making offers the central government an efficacious way of addressing

troublesome political, social and environmental issues under a single rubric.

Public opinion polls conducted over the past decade by the Prime Minister's Office and private agencies, reveal that the Japanese harbor pessimistic views about the future of their society. Rural depopulation and environmental pollution are seen as especially worrisome, and are associated with high economic growth. The central government regards such views as the consensus of popular opinion. A poll published in February 1984, six months before Takeshita's "Proposal for *Furusato* Japan," indicated that 50 *per cent* of the respondents felt that Japanese society would become more hectic and unstable in the future. The results were used in formulating the Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan now in effect.⁴¹

In response to the worries expressed by Japanese citizens, the Association of National Trust Movements in Japan was founded in 1983. The objective of the Association is to prevent the "destruction of environments of scenic or historic value through indiscriminate development or urbanization."⁴² In conjunction with the aims of *furusato-zukuri*, the preservation of historical buildings and nostalgic landscapes also constitutes an effort to reinvent a "traditional" style of social relations.

Japanese political and social commentators (*hyōronka*) tend to attribute the current preoccupation with *furusato* to the oil shocks of the early seventies. "Oil shocks" is a now clichéd expression for the reactions of the Japanese people to the dramatic rise in the cost of petroleum. It is argued that this development reminded them of their chronic dependence upon imported raw materials, and led to a re-valuation of "traditional" culture with a view to attaining self-sufficiency.

Self-sufficiency in the context of *furusato-zukuri*, however, actually embodies less an effort after political economic independence than a reclamation of cultural integrity and a native lifestyle aesthetic within a framework of internationalization. As anthropologist Harumi Befu has discerned, "the very processes of Japan's internationalization induce its separateness from the rest of the world and cause Japan to assert its cultural autonomy."⁴³ Sociologist Kurita Isamu agrees, and has argued that the search for an "Exotic Japan" by Japanese today was stimulated by the internationalization of postwar culture:

[T]he very international-ness of the life-style makes the traditional Japanese arts appear quite alien and exotic. We look at our tradition the way a foreigner does, and we are beginning to love it. It is the

product of a search for something more 'advanced' and more modish than what we have found in our century-long quest for a new culture.⁴⁴

What the oil shocks signaled for Japan was the end of high growth produced by the "economic miracle" of the 1960s. The Japanese now discovered themselves as members of a mature capitalist economy whose international basis for growth had eroded. High growth itself could no longer be regarded as a political panacea, and political confrontation with the socio-cultural costs of rapid economic affluence could no longer be postponed. The end of high growth meant the end of big spending programs, such as free medical care for the elderly and welfare support for the handicapped and children. Furthermore, the crisis precipitated the decline of progressive politics and the concomitant strengthening of conservative (LDP) influence. The LDP has since coopted the formerly progressive issues of pollution, welfare, and citizen participation.⁴⁵ Significantly, since the formation of the Association of National Trust Movements in Japan in 1983, the Environment Agency has recommended the expansion of tax-free provisions for national trust movements, and the Diet unanimously adopted a resolution to promote such movements.⁴⁶

The nostalgic experience is particularly intense where the sense of vexation and insecurity is not just limited to the present but is expected to color the future as well.⁴⁷ Since nostalgia is a barometer of present moods, the ubiquity of *furusato* would seem to bespeak a chronic pervasive anxiety on the part of Japanese today. Using cinematographic history as a social indicator, the motivations for and contexts of nostalgia today appear to be qualitatively different than in the past. Film critic Donald Richie notes that the "new nihilism" of the 1960s, an offshoot of the high premium placed on industrialization, was accompanied by a "new nostalgia." The *furusato* theme is not new to films, but in the context of the "new nostalgia," *furusato* films suggest that it no longer is possible to return to a native place. Minami Hiroshi describes a similar trend in the *enka* genre.⁴⁸

Anthropologist Fukasaka Mitsusada echoed this anxious sentiment with his remark that the Japanese "can't go home again." He has argued that

traditional patterns of life and thought are no longer possible, because Japan is no longer geographically isolated from the international community, agriculture is no longer the basis for the Japanese economy, because Japan's once beautiful nature has been destroyed by pollution and urbanization, and because the traditional culture has been completely commercialized.⁴⁹

Although Fukasaka insisted that the Japanese would begin to create “a new culture of their own,” he did not venture any suggestions as to the form and content of this “new” entity. I would suggest that the “new” culture is best understood as a political process in which the nostalgia for nostalgia is manipulated on the one hand to mask human responsibility for socio-ecological change, and on the other, to create a collectivist mythopoeia predicated on the reification of tradition to deal with the consequences of urbanization.

The nostalgia embedded in the word *furusato* and motivating the *furusato-zukuri* project is a nostalgia for a pristine native culture. This “pure” culture is presumed to have existed in pastoral tranquility until vitiated and transmogrified by outside forces—such as westernization, industrialization, urbanization, and today, internationalization. In the *furusato-zukuri* literature, change for the worse is described as precipitated by external agents. Change for the better, on the other hand, is presented as a wholly indigenous undertaking; a rallying against intrusive foreign agents. This distinction is evident in the verbs used to denote change. Change for the worse is denoted by passive expressions containing the intransitive verb, *naru* (to evolve, to become, to be). *Naru* brackets, deflects, and conceals intentionality: creation is presented as an irruption, an epiphany, a release of what already is there.

Naru contrasts with *tsukuru* (to make, to build), a transitive verb that denotes intentional, purposeful action. *Tsukuru* is linked with *furusato* to form the compound, *furusato-zukuri*. Unlike *naru*, *tsukuru* acknowledges that creation is a form of labor; a conscious construction. *Naru* elides or renders unproblematic the socio-historical conditions of production; things simply enter the realm of present actuality from somewhere in the past. Thus, when city administrators bemoan urban sprawl, they couch their complaints in *naru* expressions: a city “has become” a sprawling bedtown lacking integrity. In this way, administrators can avoid blaming specific persons and groups for that city’s problems, and instead exhort residents “to actively make” the city into a place “we can call *furusato*.” Similar rhetoric and a preponderance of *-zukuri* compounds characterize the LDP’s 1984 platform.⁵⁰

“Old Village” Villages

As a local policy, *furusato-zukuri* is not limited to cities faced with the untoward consequences of urban sprawl. It is also implemented in rural villages as a strategy to check depopulation.

The term, “*furusato-mura*” (old-village villages), designates depopulated villages seeking to attract “honorary villagers.” Honorary villagers are long-term tourists from the city who can enjoy picking mushrooms and flowering ferns, slopping hogs, and transplanting rice seedlings without having to actually depend on agriculture for a living. Neither do the native villagers, since tourism is regarded as a more lucrative and desirable enterprise.

The *Furusato* Information Center, noted earlier, functions as a clearinghouse for both prospective *furusato-mura* and honorary villagers. An example of typical copy prepared by a “village” for the perusal of an urban client and publicized by the Center is translated below. The site was newly renamed *Kôzuke-mura*, after the pre-Meiji name for the area now encompassed by Gumma Prefecture. This profile recalls Origuchi’s discourse on Yamato *cum* gateway and represents an attempt to re-create an authentically Japanese landscape, that of *furusato*.

Pursue the romance of “*Kôzuke-mura*,” Gumma’s secret frontier (gateway). The pristine currents of the “Kanagawa” flow through the center of the village, which is encircled by mountains. 94 *per cent* of the land abounds in beautiful forests—which is why it is called “Gumma’s secret frontier” [*italics in the original*].

Kôzuke-mura has a history spanning more than 200 years: the Kurozawa family house was designated a national treasure. . . . Petrified rocks impart the romance of the Age of Dinosaurs. Many natural monuments—national and prefectural treasures—are found here.

Moreover, traditional seasonal events . . . and folkarts . . . are still passed on from generation to generation in their original form.

Natural wonders and pure traditions have been preserved in their original state. Those things unnurtured in a city, like a “restful heart-mind” and “poetic sentiment,” are reawakened here.⁵¹

Most of the so-called traditional village activities performed in the *furusato* villages are either recently invented or newly revived as recreation for domestic tourists. Among them are festivals, *kagura* (Shinto music and dancing), folk *kabuki*, storytelling and folksinging sessions, handicrafts exhibitions, nature hikes, and rice-pounding contests. Honorary villagers, who pay an average annual residency fee of about \$50, enjoy other amenities as well. Back “home” in the city, they are provided with *furusato* newsletters and local produce.⁵² Real villagers, on the other hand, are entrusted with the custody of an irreplaceable (if invented) heritage: they are curators of the landscape of nostalgia.

For natives and honorary villagers alike, what is imagined and experienced is not village life, but a village-like life. Honorary

villagers are encouraged to think of a given village as if it indeed were their “new *furusato*.” This “as if” does not denote falsity, but rather refers to an imagined community. In the case of *Furusato* Tokyo, the actual cityscape and the nostalgic image of an “old village” are conflated through an act of nomenclature.

Furusato-mura provide access to another, more conceptually authentic, world but they must also be sufficiently of this world to be accessible by public or private transportation. Japan National Railways (JNR, now privatized as Japan Railways) early recognized its potential to traverse past and present. From “Discover Japan” in the 1970s to “Exotic Japan” in the 1980s, JNR advertised its world-bridging services to “homeless” urbanites. In the Meiji period, “agrarian moralists” warned of the detrimental effect trains would have on rural life.⁵³ Today, the railroad brings people back to both the countryside and a nostalgic frame of mind. Those who are unable to travel can take advantage of the Post Office’s “*furusato* parcel post” (*furusato kozutsumi*) service inaugurated in 1985. Customers can choose from a variety of regional foodstuffs and handicrafts, colorfully advertised in “*furusato* parcel post” catalogues. The parcels are then posted directly to them from local manufacturers.

Domestic tourism is a cogent means of inducing nostalgia and occasioning the experience of an (exotic) past. Railway companies, the Post Office, and developers of *furusato-mura* alike recognize that leisure, just now becoming an industry in its own right, is among other things an anodyne realm in which gratification is offered in compensation for the disturbing consequences of postwar urbanization.

Conclusion: The Making of *Furusato* Japan

Furusato-zukuri is now employed in Japan as a synonym for “cultural administration” (*bunka gyōsei*), which in turn signifies the reorientation of domestic policy since the “oil shocks” of the 1970s from a materialistic to an affective focus. The present time is referred to in various media as an “age of affect” (*kokoro no jidai*), the rationale being that since material needs have been more or less met, civil servants and city planners must attend to the spiritual needs of the Japanese people.⁵⁴ It is not my intention to debate the verity of this rationale; rather, my mention of this slogan serves to illustrate the symbolic and affective political context

within which *furusato* ideology operates. Former Prime Minister Nakasone consistently has expressed in his domestic speeches, the need for “heart-mind accord” (*kokoro no fureai*) between political administrators and the people.⁵⁵ Nakasone’s call for administrative reform is characterized as the “culturization of administration” (*gyōsei no bunkaka*), the complement of “cultural administration.”⁵⁶

City planner Mori Kei has suggested that the “culturization of administration” involves transforming the essential substance and nature of administration itself. This process includes decorating government offices with works of art; producing colorful pamphlets for public consumption which explain administrative policy in accessible, jargon-free language; making government buildings available on weekends for public use, such as for hobby classes; broadcasting music from government buildings during holidays to create a festive ambience; and nurturing affective relations between civil servants by promoting, among other strategies, the use of the more warmly respectful *sama* 様 over the indifferent *dono* 殿 when addressing colleagues in written memos.⁵⁷

Implicit in the “culturization of administration” is the idea of administrating culture and tradition. Tamura Akira, a professor of law at Hosei University, acknowledges administration itself as a cultural expression redolent of subjectivity (as opposed to bureaucratic objectivity).⁵⁸ Both culture and tradition are evoked to signify and provoke a new “value consciousness” (*kachi ishiki*) informing the *furusato-zukuri* project. Japanese planners, bureaucrats, advertisers, and the general public, seem to recognize implicitly that “traditional” aspects of culture and social life do not constitute an objectively definable inheritance, although they may eulogize them as such, but are negotiable symbolic constructs continuously reinvented in the present—and in the case of *furusato*, through the agency of nostalgia.

Furusato-zukuri concentrates on reviving and inventing shrine-like festivals in particular.⁵⁹ Shinto shrines formed the affective and, especially since the Meiji period, the administrative nexus of “traditional” village society. The nostalgic value of shrine festivals is attested by their frequent mention in *enka* lyrics and their imitation in city festivals. The early 1980s mark the beginning of a *matsuri būmu* (festival boom) in cities, although participation in regional festivals has been an objective of domestic tourism, at least since the early sixties.

As an administrative policy, *furusato-zukuri* represents both an acknowledgement of change, insofar as it constitutes a reaction to postwar changes, and an attempt to control change by restoring a sense of socio-cultural continuity with respect to that which is

perceived to verge on the discontinuous. The *that* is postwar Japan, which for the past forty years apparently has proceeded along a trajectory at variance with its emerging ideological antithesis: “traditional” Japan, the Japan of nostalgic memories. With a view to resuscitating the Japanese spirit, Former Prime Minister Nakasone declared the imminent end of the postwar era. He announced that a new era, one divorced from the guilt of imperialist excesses, the humiliation of defeat, the American Occupation, and, by extension, the oil shocks, must begin.⁶⁰ Those institutions imposed upon Japan by SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers), such as the constitution and the educational system, must, insisted Nakasone, undergo a total re-evaluation and be rendered more Japanese.

Nakasone created the Ad Hoc Commission on Education in 1984 to propose educational reforms in the direction of “individuality” and “internationality.” The Commission has defined individuality in terms of the “particularity of Japanese culture.” On June 26, 1985, the Commission submitted its first proposals, which called for efforts to “nurture deep understanding of Japanese culture and love of Japan among students” as a prerequisite for Japan to “gain [the] trust of and make contributions to the international community.”⁶¹ The message delivered collectively by present day proponents of *furusato-zukuri*, is that individualism must be contained and defined by a “new” postwar culture.

Furusato Japan is an ideological construct of *post-postwar* Japan. A series of savings bonds advertisements published by the Ministry of Finance cogently illustrates the political project which underlies the construct. These advertisements constitute a visual representation of “cultural administration,” and, in keeping with the “Proposal for *Furusato* Japan,” encouraged the re-valuation of native culture and tradition. All of them feature scenes from Shinto festivals. An early (1983) version consists of a color woodblock print of a shrine festival in progress.⁶² In the right margin is a poem celebrating the tutelary deity of an archetypical “old village.” The poem is sandwiched between the slogan: “*Ii naa. Furusato Nippon,*” which may be translated, with a touch of wistfulness as: “Ahh, it’s so fine. Native Japan.” The generic quality of this festive scene is further connoted by the use of the *hiragana* (*yamatokotoba*) form of *furusato* in the slogan.

A later (1985) edition of the same savings bond advertisement features photographs of costumed children taking part in their respective hometown festivals.⁶³ Regardless of whether the festivals in question—such as the *mushi okuri* (“insect” expelling) festival in Ainai (Aomori Prefecture) depicted in the June advertisement—

are long-standing or recently revived, they nevertheless are real, unlike the generic festival scene of the earlier advertisement.

The caption of these later ads reads "*Watashi no furusato, watashi no Nippon*," or, "My *furusato*, my Japan." This slogan unequivocally identifies native-place with the nation and conflates localism and nationalism. In this connection, the syllables *fu-ru-sa-to* inserted alongside the ideograph effectively assimilate each "old village" featured within the larger and largest community, *Furusato* Japan. The caption determines and guides the reception of the photographic image: *Furusato* Japan may exist only within the framework of the advertisement itself, but the use of photographs of actual hometown festivals help to bridge the ideological distance between local nostalgia and national purpose.

The savings bonds advertisements of the Ministry of Finance gloss over the often divisive and exclusionist nature of shrine festival participation at the local level,⁶⁴ leaving unacknowledged the problematic relationship between local politics and the central bureaucracy. The festivals, photographed for commercial purposes, are severed from their singular, local contexts and are re-presented as metonyms and symbols of a national pristine village tradition. The *Furusato* Cities, Towns, and Villages throughout Japan represent concentric circles of insideness, each ringing their respective core constituencies. They are encompassed in turn by *Furusato* Japan, the largest of the imagined communities. The invented micro-heritages of *Furusato* Tokyo and *furusato-mura* throughout Japan collectively constitute the proposed macro-heritage represented by *Furusato* Japan; the local is a metonym of the national.

The continuous generational transmission of native folkways is advocated quite literally in the above advertisements through the portrayal of children re-enacting presumably historical festive rituals. This device effectively traditionalizes the new while simultaneously perpetuating seemingly old traditions. The advertisements also equate the survival of "tradition" with the solvency of the central government. Although advertisements for government savings bonds, they at the same time urge an emotional investment and participation in that exclusive community, *Furusato* Japan. The implication is that nostalgia is as redeemable as government savings bonds, and that in the imagination of the past is the construction of the future. The *Furusato* Japan advertisements offer Japanese citizens *cum* investors a cultural, cognitive bargain that they cannot refuse.⁶⁵

In promoting civic insideness or we-feelings by implicitly encouraging the staging of shrine-like festivals as a style of citizen

participation, the central government and local municipalities resemble their Meiji counterparts. But where the latter created shrine-centered administrative villages in a concerted effort to foster national spiritual unity,⁶⁶ the present government is expropriating local festivals toward a similar end. The outcome is both the cultural and political appropriation and reconstruction of the local by the national, and the permeation and restraint of the national by the local.

The nostalgic potential, sentimental value, and apparent historicity of *furusato* imbue it, and whatever it is prefixed to, with authenticity and cultural relativity. “*Furusato* Japan” effects a far more endearing image than does *bunka kokka* (cultural polity), the abstract term popularized during the Occupation by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) to characterize postwar Japan. Appropriated at different administrative levels and popularized in the mass media, *furusato* is engendered by nostalgic memories just as it engenders the remembering of nostalgia. Prefixed to Japan, *furusato* facilitates the collective “re-remembering” of a national community dis-membered by defeat in war and more recently, by the uncertainties of an international economy which have rendered the “future” a political problem.

Notes

Acknowledgements: The research for this article was supported in part by the following: the U.S. Department of Education, Fulbright-Hays Research Abroad award (Nos. G008300855); the International Doctoral Research Fellowship Program for Japan of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities; the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research award (No. 4492); Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society; the Japanese Ministry of Education, Monbusho Scholarship. This article is informed by Chapters 1 and 6 of my doctoral dissertation, *The Making of Kodaira; Being an Ethnography of a Japanese City's Progress* (Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, August 1985). Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Rochester Anthropology Colloquium (1985) and 1986 Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting. Special thanks to Larry Carney and Serena Tennekoon for their help in the preparation of this manuscript.

1. *Nostalgia of Kobe* (*Kobe-shi, Keizaikyoku bōekikankyōka*), No. 95 (1983), p. 12.
2. My analysis counterpoints Clifford Geertz's perception that ideology is constructed as a cultural system with Anthony Giddens' observation that symbol systems have ideological aspects. C. Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (New York: Basic Books), pp. 193–233; A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 187.

3. *Kōjien*, 2d enl. ed., 3d printing (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), pp. 563, 895. Other character compounds for *furusato* include 故里 and 故里.
4. Professor Robert J. Smith mentioned to me that during his period of fieldwork in Shikoko in the 1950s, most Japanese of his acquaintance referred to their “native place” as *kokyō*. By the “miracle Sixties,” the relentless pace of industrialization, urbanization, and urban migration, had significantly reduced the number of viable “old villages.” Thus when localism emerged as a movement in the mid 1970s along with the re-valuation of indigenous customs and ceremonies, it was not the structural “old village” and that was resuscitated, but rather the affective potential of “old villages.”
5. Here I follow Roland Barthes in distinguishing between denotation (objective meaning) and connotation (coded—cultural—meaning). See his, “The Photographic Image,” in R. Barthes, *Barthes: Selected Readings* (New York: Fontana/Collins, 1983), pp. 194–210.
6. Mita M., “*Kindai Nihon no shinjō no shinboru no jiten*” (A glossary of symbols of modern Japanese sentiments), in Kata K. and Tsukuda S., eds. *Zōhohan. Ryūkōka no himitsu* (The mystery of popular songs. Enlarged edition) (Tokyo: Bunwa Shobo, 1980), pp. 220–25.
7. Cf. F. Davis, *Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 82–83.
8. In particular, those cited in this article.
9. Minami, H., “*Nihon no ryūkōka*” (Japanese popular songs), in Kata and Tsukuda, eds., *Zōhohan. Ryūkōka no himitsu*, p. 146.
10. Kobayashi H., “*Kokyō o ushinatta bungaku*” (Homeless literature), in Kobayashi Hideo *shū* (The works of Kobayashi Hideo), *Chikuma gendai bungaku taikai*, Vol. 43 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo), p. 288.
11. *Minna no Tokyo*, (December 1, 1984); see also My Town Concept Consultative Council, ed., *Tokyo Tomorrow* (Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 1982). See *Furusato Tokyo Matsuri Jikkō Inka*, ed., *Dai yon kai “Furusato Tokyo matsuri”* (Tokyo: *Tokyo-to seikatsu bunkakyoku*, 1986).
12. Quoted in T. Higuchi, *The Visual and Spatial Structure of Landscapes*, trans. C.S. Terry (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), p. 186.
13. K.B. Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885–1895* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 161.
14. C. Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 16.
15. See *ibid.*, especially Chapter 6; also T.R.H. Havens, *Farm and Nation in Modern Japan: Agrarian Nationalism, 1870–1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
16. Quoted in T. Higuchi, *The Visual and Spatial Structure of Landscapes*, p. 99.
17. Origuchi, quoted in *ibid.*
18. See Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, p. 250.
19. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), p. 122.
20. Matsumoto K., “*Sengo sono seishin fūkei: kotoba*” (The spiritual landscape of the postwar era: language), *Asahi Shinbun*, (August 19, 1980).
21. See T. Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (New York: Kodansha International, 1986). First published in Japanese under the title, *Amae no kōzō* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1971).
22. D.D. Mitchell, *Amaeru: The Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 78.
23. Sakada T., *Bunka gyōsei—kaku jichitai no jissenrei*” (Cultural administration—empirical examples from each region), in Sakada, ed., *Hirogaru bunka gyōsei*, pp. 300–02.
24. Yamaguchi A., “‘Chihō no jidai’ no onimotsu—chihōgikai” (The impedimenta of “age of localism”: regional assemblies), *Chūō Kōron*, 2:1131 (1981), pp. 208–223.

25. Isomura E., *Chihō no jidai—sōzō to sentaku no shihyō* (Age of localism—indicators for creation and selection) (Tokyo: Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1981), pp. 16, 208.
26. Regarding local autonomy, for a cogent summary and case history, respectively, see Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, Chapter 6 in particular, and R.J. Samuels, *The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan. Localities Incorporated?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
27. Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, p. 193.
28. The Center is located within the *Zenkoku Chōson Kaikan* (National Town and Village Institute). *Furusato jōhō senta dayori*, No. 5 (1986); Nakajima M., "Furusato jōhō sentā no genkyō" (The present status of the *Furusato* Information Center), *Rinso Tenbō*, No. 198 (1986), pp. 102-9.
29. *Furusato Jōhō Sentā*, ed., *Toshi seikatsusha no furusato jōhō ni kansuru niizu chōsa kekka hōkokusho* (Tokyo: *Furusato Jōhō Sentā*, 1986), pp. 16-17, 48.
30. See Sakada T., ed., *Atarashii chiiki shakai-zukuri* (Building a new regional society), *Chihō no jidai/jissen shiriizu* (Age of localism: empirical examples), Vol. 5 (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1984); Sakada T., ed., *Hirogaru bunka gyōsei* (The spread of cultural administration), *Chihō no jidai/jissen shiriizu*, Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1984); and Tamura A. and Mori K., eds., *Bunka gyōsei to machi-zukuri* (Cultural administration and city [place]-building) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1985).
31. Okuno, *Bungaku ni okeru genfūkei* (Original landscapes in literature) (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1975), pp. 72-72.
32. Davis, *Yearning for Yesterday*, p. 10.
33. R. Handler and J. Linnekin, "Tradition, Genuine or Spurious," *Journal of American Folklore*, 97:385 (1984), p. 287.
34. Cf. I. Hacking, "Science Turned Upside Down," (Review of I. Bernard Cohen), *Revolution in Science*, (Harvard.), *The New York Review of Books*, (February 27, 1986), p. 21.
35. The notion of the traditional as revolutionary is the subject of a recent and compelling article by C.J. Calhoun: "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?," *American Journal of Sociology*, 88:5 (1983), pp. 886-914.
36. Davis, *Yearning for Yesterday*, pp. 34, 107; and F. Jameson, "Walter Benjamin, or Nostalgia," in R. Boyers, ed., *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), p. 53.
 Christopher Lasch similarly notes that, as Christopher Hill and E.P. Thompson have shown,
 many radical movements in the past have drawn strength and sustenance from the myth or memory of a golden age in the still more distant past. . . . The belief that in some ways the past was a happier time by no means rests on sentimental illusion; nor does it lead to a backward-looking, reactionary paralysis of the political will (*The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* [New York: Warner Books, 1979], pp. 24-25).
 William Kelly juxtaposes rationalization with nostalgia in analyzing the "cultural dynamics of new middle-class Japan" ("Rationalization and Nostalgia: Cultural Dynamics of New Middle-Class Japan," *American Ethnologist* 13:4 [1986], pp. 603-618). Kelly does not, however, make problematic the characteristics and operations of nostalgia as I attempt to do in this article. Nostalgia in postwar Japan is a central theme in both my dissertation, noted in the acknowledgements, and my article, "Japanese Farm Manuals: A Literature of Discovery," *Peasant Studies* 11:3 (1984), pp. 169-192.
37. Cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Chapter 2.
38. Takeshita N. and Kusayanagi D., "'Nippon rettō furusato ron' no zentaizō" (A comprehensive portrait of the "Proposal for *Furusato* Japan), *Biggu Ee*, 12 (1986), p. 10. See also "Showa 59-nen tō undo hōshin" (1984 [Liberal Democratic] Party platform), *Jiyūminshu*, 3 (March 1984), pp. 164-240.

39. Tanaka, K., *Nippon rettō kaizō ron* (Proposal for remodeling Japan) (Tokyo: Nikkan Kōgyō Shinbunsha, 1973), pp. i-ii.
40. Handler and Linnekin, "Tradition, Genuine or Spurious," pp. 285-286. The inventedness of tradition is also the subject of E. Hobsbawm and R. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
41. *Japan Times*, (February 5, 1984); and Yano-Tsuneta Kinenkai, ed., *Nippon: A Charged Survey of Japan* (Tokyo: Kokuseisha, 1985), pp. 35, 313-317.
42. K. Kihara, "Nature and History at Stake—The Emerging National Trust Movements," *Japan Quarterly*, 33:2 (1986), p. 190. Comparison may be drawn with Britain's "National Heritage," presented as an imagined community by M. Bommes and P. Wright, "'Charms of Residence': The Public and the Past," in R. Johnson, G. McLennan, B. Schwarz, and D. Sutton, eds., *Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), pp. 253-270.
43. H. Befu, "Internationalization of Japan and Nihon Bunkaron," in H. Mannari and H. Befu, eds., *The Challenge of Japan's Internationalization* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1938) p. 261.
44. I. Kurita, "Revival of the Japanese Tradition," *Journal of Popular Culture*, 17:1 (1983), p. 131. Similarities can be drawn with D. MacCannell's theory of tourism as a pursuit of authentic social experience in "post-industrial or modern society," a society which has "turned in on itself," in *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), p. 182.
45. Samuels, *The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan*. pp. 214-19; and "Shōwa 59-nen to undō hōshin," pp. 164-240.
46. Kihara, "Nature and History at Stake. . .," p. 194.
47. C.A.A. Zwingmann, "'Heimweh' or 'Nostalgic Reaction': A Conceptual Analysis and Interpretation of a Medico-Psychological Phenomenon" (Ph.D. thesis, School of Education, Stanford University, 1959), p. 199.
48. D. Richie, *The Japanese Movie*. Revised ed. (New York: Kodansha International, 1982), p. 195; Minami H., "*Nihon no ryūkōka*."
49. Quoted in H. Wagatsuma, "Problems of Cultural Identity in Modern Japan," in G. De Vos and L. Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change* (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1975), p. 330.
50. Maruyama Masao's discourse on reality and the process of creation (in the context of the thought and behaviour patterns of Japan's wartime leaders) offers valuable insights into the distinction between *tsukuri* and *naru*. Maruyama shows that for Japan's wartime leaders, reality was
not something in the process of creation or about to be created; rather it [was] that which has already been created or, to be more specific, that which has arisen from somewhere in the past. Therefore to act realistically [meant] to be tied to the past.
Similarly, reality [was] not something to be grasped by the individual in order to build a new future; it [was] a blind inevitability flowing from a determined past (Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, trans. M. Hane [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], p. 196).
- Maruyama's observations provoke additional interpretations about the agency of *furusato-zukuri*, such as the notion that the native-place building involves both a conscious construction and a "release of what already is there." By the same token, *furusato-zukuri* might also be construed as an intentional re-charting of a flowing, determined past. Both interpretations pertain, in turn, to the present-past dialectic manifested in *furusato* ideology.
51. Nakajima, "*Furusato jōhō senta no genkyō*," p. 105.
52. *Asahi Shinbun*, (March 13, 1983); *Furusato Jōhō Sentā*, ed., *Furusato gaido, ibento, gyōji* (*Furusato* guide, events, seasonal activities) (Tokyo: *Furusato Jōhō Sentā*, [1985]); M. Kawashima, "'*Furusato-mura*' o yugamemai" (Do not demean "*furusato* villages"), in Sakada, ed., *Atarashii chiiki shakai-zukuri*, pp. 121-26; Sakada T., "*Atarashii chiiki kezai no fukkō*" The revival of new regional economies), in Sakada, ed., *Atarashii chiiki shakai-zukuri*, pp. 353-419.
53. Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, p. 163.

54. Cf. *Uruoi no Aru Machi-Zukuri Kenkyūkai*, ed., *Uruoi no aru machi-zukuri* (Building a city [place] with neighborly charm) (Tokyo: Taisei Shuppansha), pp. 21–22.
55. Nakasone, Y., “*Kokumin to susumu 21-seki e no kōro*” (A path to the 21st century in accord with the people), *Jiyūminshu*, 4 (April 1984), pp. 173–80.
56. Ando S., “*Gyōsei no bunkaka o megutte*” (Examining the culturization of administration), in Sakada, ed., *Hirogaru bunka gyōsei*, pp. 143–54; Kitazawa T., et al., “*Ronten: shitsugi ōtō*” (Problematic issues: questions and answers), in Tamura and Mori, eds., *Bunka gyōsei to machi-zukuri*, pp. 296–319; and Mori, “*Gyōsei no bunkaka*,” pp. 49–62.
 “Administration of culture” and “culturization of administration” bring to mind Kenneth Pyle’s notion of “the technology of nationalism” of the 1920s and 1930s, that is, techniques devised by bureaucrats “to mobilize the material and spiritual resources of the population in order to cope with social problems and to provide support for Japanese imperialism” (“The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, 33:1 [1973], p. 53). While *Furusato Nippon* is probably not an imperialist design, the characterization of *furusato-zukuri* as a type of “technology of nationalism” emphasizes not the “what” but the “how”: how public consciousness is structured.
57. Mori, “*Gyōsei no bunkaka*,” p. 56; see also Tamura A., “*Bunka gyōsei to ‘machi-zukuri’*,” in Tamura and Mori, eds., *Bunka gyōsei to machi-zukuri*, pp. 3–20, 52–61.
58. Tamura, “*Bunka gyōsei to ‘machi-zukuri’*,” pp. 6, 54.
59. For example, Matsumoto, “*Sengo sono seishin fūkei*”; and Sakai T., *Shi to kokyō* (Poetry and native-place) Tokyo: Ofūsha, 1971), p. 26.
60. For perspective on Nakasone’s political and ideological project against the background of the international dilemmas facing Japanese society, see the articles comprising “A Forum on the Trade Crisis,” special issue of *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 13:2 (1987), especially Kenneth B. Pyle “In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future,” pp. 243–270; and Michio Muramatsu, “In Search of National Identity: The Politics and Policies of the Nakasone Administration” pp. 307–342.
61. *Japan Times*, (April 25, 1985 & June 27, 1985). Harumi Befu’s contention that internationalization and nationalism are two sides of the same coin is evident here.
62. *Asahi Shinbun*, November 25, 1983.
63. *Ibid.*, June 1, 1985.
64. For information on shrine and shrine-like urban festivals, see my article, “A Dialectic of Native and Newcomer: The Kodaira Citizens’ Festival in Suburban Tokyo,” *Anthropological Quarterly* (forthcoming) 60:3[1987], pp. 124–136.
65. W.O. Beeman, “Freedom to Choose: Symbols and Values in American Advertising,” in H. Varenne, ed., *Symbolizing America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 65.
66. The Meiji government inaugurated the shrine merger program in 1906. The plan was to have a single, central shrine as the exclusive focus of both communal solidarity and national consciousness (see W.M. Fridell, *Japanese Shrine Mergers 1906–12* [Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1973]).